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reating a physician-assisted suicide (PAS) regime for cancer, 
ALS,1 and AIDS is relatively easy.  While to be human is to be a 
“being-unto-death,”2 meant to suffer from the terminal malady of 
mortality, as a community we are comfortable with the notion that a 
distinct meaning adheres to the category of “terminal illness.”3  And 
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1 “Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is a progressive, adult-onset motor neuron 
disease characterized by loss of motor function and ultimately death.”  KATHRYN BAYLES 
& CHERYL TOMOEDA, COGNITIVE-COMMUNICATION DISORDERS OF DEMENTIA 130 
(2007). 
2 See Michael Bavidge, Ageing and Human Nature, in DEMENTIA: MIND, MEANING, 
AND THE PERSON 41, 50 (Julian C. Hughes et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter DEMENTIA].  The 
characterization of man as a “being unto death” initially comes from the philosopher 
Heidegger.  See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (1980). 
3 See Howard Brody, Assisted Suicide for Those Not Terminally Ill, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 7, 7 (“The factual point is a reminder that the term ‘terminal’ has 
very limited medical utility and significance.”). 
 For example, under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act it is unclear whether the 
definition of terminal is meant to be with or without treatment.  JOHN KEOWN, 
EUTHANASIA, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST LEGISLATION 167, 
171 (2002); see also Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 44–45 
(1996).  Further, over fifty percent of Oregon doctors say they cannot predict whether a 
patient will die within six months.  See KEOWN, supra, at 172.  But see Yale Kamisar, The 
C
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while physicians may lack confidence in their abilities to predict 
when one with such an illness has less than six months to live4 (as is 
the accepted timeline in current and proposed PAS statutes5), this 
does not bother society.  Their prediction will be close enough for 
government work literally as hospice care is available under Medicare 
only when one has ceased all curative therapy and has been diagnosed 
with less than six months to live.6  Maybe the patient will live longer, 
maybe less.  But barring a rare miracle, they are going to die soon.  
Leave them alone.  The diagnosis of “six months to live,” while if 
pushed analytically may be revealed as a metaphor rather than a literal 
chronological measure of time, nonetheless presents to the world an 
appearance of a noninterpretive bright line: six months is six months, 
June to December. 
Interestingly, neither of the two primary metaphors weaving in and 
out of the current PAS dialogue—“death with dignity”7 and 
“unbearable suffering”8—correlate strongly with six months to live.  
 
“Right to Die”: On Drawing (and Erasing) Lines, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 504 (1996) 
(“‘Deciding what should count as terminally ill will pose such severe difficulties that it 
seems untenable as a criterion for permitting physician-assisted suicide.’” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
4 See KEOWN, supra note 3, at 172. 
5 For example, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the equivalent, recently passed 
Washington statute require that the patient be “diagnosed with a terminal illness that will 
lead to death within [six] months.”  JOHN B. MITCHELL, UNDERSTANDING ASSISTED 
SUICIDE: NINE ISSUES TO CONSIDER 90 (2007); see Janet I. Tu, Assisted Suicide Measure 
Passes: Initiative 1000, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A3.  Likewise, the failed 
California Compassionate Choices Act required an “incurable and irreversible disease” 
that would “within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months.”  A.B. 
374, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). 
6 See 42 C.F.R. § 418.20 (2009) (providing eligibility requirements for hospice care 
under Medicare); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (b)(1) (“The certification must specify that the 
individual’s prognosis is for a life expectancy of [six] months or less if the terminal illness 
runs its normal course.”). 
7 This right is alleged to sound in autonomy.  John B. Mitchell, My Father, John Locke, 
and Assisted Suicide: The Real Constitutional Right, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 57 
(2006).  The right has alternatively been described as the “right to die,” ALAN MEISEL, 
THE RIGHT TO DIE 3–12 (1989), the right to “choose and to control the time, place, 
conditions, and manner of dying,” MARGARET SOMERVILLE, DEATH TALK: THE CASE 
AGAINST EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 31 (2001), and “death with 
dignity,” Callahan & White, supra note 3, at 20; Martin Gunderson & David J. Mayo, 
Altruism and Physician Assisted Death, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 281, 284–87 (1993); see also 
Mitchell, supra, at 57–60 (surveying the various notions of “dignity”). 
8 Unlike the Oregon statute, see generally MITCHELL, supra note 5, the Netherlands 
based access to assisted death (or “euthanasia,” as they refer to it) on the concept of 
“unbearable suffering.”  See KEOWN, supra note 3, at 108–10; ROBERT I. MISBIN, 
EUTHANASIA: THE GOOD OF THE PATIENT, THE GOOD OF SOCIETY 69, 72–73 (1992).  
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“Death with dignity” is, as the phrase states, about the manner of 
one’s death.  People react to the narrative—tubes, soiled adult 
diapers,9 complete dependence10—and become upset beyond 
comprehension.  But nothing in that story correlates with “terminal 
illness” conjoined with “six months to live.”  The metaphor of 
“unbearable suffering,” in contrast, is a function of living.  While the 
public discourse about unbearable suffering rests primarily upon 
images of rampaging physical pain,11 “suffering” is far more complex 
 
Problematically for those seeking to confine the scope of PAS under an unbearable 
suffering standard is that suffering encompasses far more than physical pain.  See E. 
Emanuel et al., Evaluating Requests for Assisted Suicide, in EUTHANASIA: 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES COMPANION 49, 50–51 (Lisa Yount ed., 2002) (“Loss of control, 
fear of abandonment or burdening others, financial hardships, physical and psychological 
symptoms, and personal beliefs are all potential causes of suffering.”).  See generally 
DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: IN SEARCH OF A PEACEFUL DEATH 
100–02 (2000); Nathan I. Cherny & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of 
Refractory Symptoms: Guidelines for Evaluation and Treatment, 10 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 
31, 34 (1994) (“The approach suggested in the evaluation of unrelieved physical 
symptoms becomes more difficult if symptoms are psychological or suffering is perceived 
to relate to existential or spiritual concerns.”); Harvey M. Chochinov & Leonard Schwartz, 
Depression and the Will to Live in the Psychological Landscape of Terminally Ill Patients, 
in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE RIGHT TO END-OF-LIFE CARE 261, 
298–302 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002) [hereinafter THE CASE AGAINST 
ASSISTED SUICIDE]; Stacy DiLoreto, The Complexities of Assisted Suicide, 34 PATIENT 
CARE 65, 69 (2000); Herbert Hendin, Suicide, Assisted Suicide, and Medical Illness, 
HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER, Jan. 2000, at 4–7; Zbigniew Zylicz, Ethical 
Considerations in the Treatment of Pain in a Hospice Environment, 41 PATIENT EDUC. & 
COUNSELING 47, 47–53 (2000).  In fact, the Dutch have approved euthanasia for extreme 
psychological suffering.  See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 83. 
9 See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 60. 
It is this latter narrative, this dying without dignity, which the proponents of PAS 
sought to prevent.  In this bad death narrative, the person is in pain and soiling 
himself, with tubes and machines humming away . . . . Why must a patient 
endure this?  Why can the patient not exercise his autonomy and choose to end 
this mockery of his existence with the assistance of a physician through PAS?  
To permit less denies them the right to die with dignity. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
10 See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 22 (2006). 
The fact is that human beings come into the world with a passion for control, 
they go out of the world the same way, and research suggests that if they lose 
their ability to control things at any point between their entrance and their exit, 
they become unhappy, helpless, hopeless, and depressed. . . . And occasionally 
dead. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
11 See, e.g., DEREK HUMPHRY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE: PEOPLE, 
POLITICS, AND THE RIGHT-TO-DIE MOVEMENT 57 (1998); Paul van der Maas & Linda L. 
Emanuel, Factual Findings, in REGULATING HOW WE DIE: THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND 
 1088 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 1085 
than physical pain, including the psychological, emotional and 
existential aspects within its ambit.12  Again, a person with a terminal 
illness and six months to live may suffer great pain, and some 
certainly do, but not invariably so. 
So, what is going on?  Acceptance of PAS reflects intuitions about 
the entitlement of autonomous individuals to try to influence some of 
the details of the otherwise inevitable.  The attitude is: “I know I’m 
going to go, but I’d like to go in my own small way if I can.”13  Still, 
those intuitions cannot be wholesale inserted into the concrete reality 
of social life without concern about cabining their scope.  In short, 
counterintuitions tell us that we do not want to sanction at-will PAS.  
So our choice is “terminal” plus “six months.”  This limitation neatly 
circumscribes the scope of PAS under circumstances that serve as a 
comfortable proxy for the death with dignity and unbearable suffering 
metaphors.  As I previously mentioned, cancer, ALS, and AIDS are 
easy; dimentia is not. 
The debate over PAS will face the greatest complexities and 
challenges concerning PAS and dementia.14 As shall be shown, 
 
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 151, 157 (Linda L. Emanuel 
ed., 1998) (stating that “less than [ten] percent of cancer cases involve untreatable pain”). 
12 See supra note 8. 
13 See Mitchell, supra note 7, at 61. 
14 Dementia will not be the only contender for expanding the scope of PAS beyond the 
“terminal, six months to live” framework.  On a conceptual level, the question has been 
raised whether respect for autonomy and the desire to end suffering—the moral values 
allegedly underlying PAS—can be confined to terminal illnesses.  Id. 
To suggest that all competent adults have the right to physician assisted suicide 
would be startling to most.  The fact is that over time, it may be difficult to limit 
PAS’s use to those we now envision as terminally ill and suffering.  First, 
assuming we can even define who is and who is not terminally ill, . . . it will not 
be reasonable to confine the right to only the terminally ill. . . . Non-terminal 
patients suffering as the result of massive injuries or those inflicted with a 
wasting disease can, in some ways, be in a far worse position than those with a 
terminal illness, e.g. six months or a year to live.  The suffering of non-terminal 
patients can go on and on, while, for the terminally ill, the end is in sight. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  Wasting diseases, such as Parkinson’s, and severe disabilities will 
likely also be raised as candidates for PAS.  Of note, former Governor Booth Gardner, 
who is suffering from Parkinson’s disease, led a successful campaign in Washington State 
for an Oregon-like PAS law.  See Daniel Bergner, Death in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
2, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 40.  In fact, the majority of those seeking the assistance of 
Dr. Jack Kevorkian had degenerate, rather than terminal, illnesses.  See Brody, supra note 
3, at 7.  The challenge will be to establish a method for deciding when such a person may 
be entitled to PAS.  The time from first diagnosis to substantial physical degenerations 
may be many years.  What metaphor should be chosen to give sufficient clarity to when 
the line justifying access to PAS has been crossed?  Physical disabilities bear significant 
issues in addition to the need to develop an acceptable metaphor to describe the physical 
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dementia is not capable of neat definitions or bright lines comparable 
to “six months to live.”  “No hard scientific boundary [separates] 
disease [dementia] and [normal aging].”15  Instead, dementia is a 
syndrome16 during which a person suffers from “multiple cognitive 
deficits sufficient to interfere with social and occupational 
functioning.”17  Yet there can be no doubt that dementia is 
accompanied by at least as strong an image of “loss of human 
dignity” and “suffering” as accompanies cancer.  I have some 
personal sense of this.  My mother had dementia.  She lived in an 
Alzheimer’s residence, and died from Alzheimer’s disease. 
In considering PAS and dementia, one faces issues of significant 
scale, both numerical and conceptual.  Numerically, four-and-a-half 
 
condition qualifying the individual as a candidate for PAS.  The disability community has 
consistently expressed apprehension concerning the legalization of PAS.  For example, “a 
long list of state and national disability rights organization [sic]” joined other 
constituencies in opposing California’s proposed PAS law.  See Californians Against 
Assisted Suicide: For the Third Time in Three Years, Assisted Suicide Fails to Get Support 
in the Assembly, BIOTECH WEEK, June 27, 2007, at 976.  See generally Timothy H. Lillie 
& James L. Werth, Jr., End-of-Life Issues and Persons with Disabilities: Introduction to 
the Special Issue, 16 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 2 (2005).  Underlying the disability 
community’s opposition are two concerns.  First, PAS currently would take place within a 
societal context where the lives of the disabled are perceived to be worth less than the lives 
of the nondisabled (a so-called “ablest society”).  See, e.g., Ron Amundson & Gayle Taira, 
Our Lives and Ideologies: The Effect of Life Experience on the Perceived Morality of the 
Policy of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 16 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 53, 55 (2005) (stating 
that some caregivers believe the seriously disabled would be “better off dead”); Rhoda 
Olkin, Why I Changed My Mind About Physician-Assisted Suicide: How Stanford 
University Made a Radical Out of Me, 16 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 68, 70 (2005) 
(stating that “people without disabilities judge the quality of the lives of people with 
disabilities more harshly than do the people with disabilities themselves”); James L. 
Werth, Jr., Concerns About Decisions Related to Withholding/Withdrawing Life-
Sustaining Treatment and Futility for Persons with Disabilities, 16 J. DISABILITY POL’Y 
STUD. 31, 32 (2005) (noting that people with disabilities are often considered to have a 
poor quality of life). 
 Second, that same ablest society continues to deny the disabled the support and material 
resources needed in order to live a life fulfilled.  See Paul K. Longmore, Policy, Prejudice, 
and Reality: Two Case Studies of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 16 J. DISABILITY POL’Y 
STUD. 38, 38–44 (2005) (showing how discrimination regarding access to services led 
quadriplegics to seek PAS); Richard Radtke, A Case Against Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
16 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 58, 58 (2005) (observing that an “unsupportive 
environment” can cause the disabled to underestimate the potential for a decent quality of 
life). 
 Without massive efforts to educate the public about the disabled, along with 
corresponding changes in public attitudes and increased provisions for needed material 
resources, this strong opposition will likely continue. 
15 Julian C. Hughes et al., Seeing Whole, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 1, 2. 
16 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 3. 
17 Id. 
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million Americans currently suffer from Alzheimer’s disease,18 the 
leading cause of dementia in older adults.19  By the middle of the 
century (unless a cure is found20) as many as fourteen million adults 
may suffer from Alzheimer’s disease.21  In comparison, 10.8 million 
people in this country had some form of cancer in 2004.22  
Alzheimer’s, moreover, causes only a little over half of all 
dementia.23  Vascular (i.e., strokes) dementia,24 Lewy body 
dementia,25 Pick’s disease,26 other rarer causes,27 and so-called 
 
18 LYNDA A. MARKUT & ANATOLE CRANE, DEMENTIA CAREGIVERS SHARE THEIR 
STORIES: A SUPPORT GROUP IN A BOOK 3 (2005); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S 
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 
189 (1993) (stating that one quarter to one half of those over eighty-five are seriously 
demented); NANCY L. MACE & PETER V. RABINS, THE 36-HOUR DAY: A FAMILY GUIDE 
TO CARING FOR PERSONS WITH ALZHEIMER DISEASE, RELATED DEMENTING ILLNESSES, 
AND MEMORY LOSS IN LATER LIFE 7 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that there are an estimated 
“[four] million people in the United States [that] have some degree of intellectual 
impairment”); Alison Phinney, Living with Dementia from the Patient’s Perspective, J. 
GERONTOLOGICAL NURSING, June 1998, at 8, 9 (estimating that eight percent of 
individuals sixty-five and older in North America, Europe, and Asia have dementia).  
Those over eighty-five comprise the fastest growing segment of our population.  See 
DEREK HUMPREY & MARY CLEMENT, FREEDOM TO DIE: PEOPLE, POLICIES, AND THE 
RIGHT TO DIE MOVEMENT 9–10 (2000). 
19 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2.  Note, however, that the only way to 
diagnose Alzheimer’s disease with certainty is through an autopsy.  See MACE & RABINS, 
supra note 18, at 293. 
20 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 298–311 (describing current research); 
Carmelo Aquilina & Julian C. Hughes, The Return of the Living Dead: Agency Lost and 
Found?, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 143, 148–49; see also Roger Bullock, New Drugs 
for Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias, 180 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 135, 135–39 
(2002). 
21 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2; Stephen G. Post, Severely Demented 
Elderly People: A Case Against Senicide, 38 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 715, 715 (1990).  In 
fact, these numbers may understate the truth.  A recent Mayo Clinic study indicates that an 
additional one million older Americans suffer a “milder type of mental decline that often 
precedes Alzheimer’s.”  See Marilynn Marchione, U.S. Facing “Crisis” of Millions with 
Pre-Dementia, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 29, 2008, at A5. 
22 See AM. CANCER SOC’Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2008, at 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.cancer.org/downloads/STT/2008CAFFfinalsecured.pdf. 
23 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2; MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 1; 
MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 290 (discussing that Alzheimer’s comprises fifty to 
sixty percent of dementia cases). 
24 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2, 83. 
25 Id. at 2, 105. 
26 For a description of this rare brain disorder, see MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 
4. 
27 Dementia can also be the result of Down syndrome, BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra 
note 1, at 75–76; Parkinson’s disease, id. at 93; Huntington’s disease, id. at 115; 
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“mixed” dementias28 (e.g., vascular disease and Alzheimer’s disease 
combined) will only add to the number of adults with dementia. 
The conceptual aspects of PAS and dementia will likewise play out 
on a large scale.  The dialogue over assisted suicide for the terminally 
ill currently revolves around notions such as dignity, sacredness of 
life, autonomy, and slippery slopes.  While such concepts will retain a 
place in any consideration of PAS for the demented, they will not 
reside at the center.  Rather, at the core of this dialogue will be 
competing, complex narratives—constructed from cultural lore, 
philosophy, and medicine—over the extent to which the demented are 
full human beings, entitled to be valued as such.  For the more those 
suffering dementia are placed in narratives where they are “no longer 
the same person,” or lacking “the prerequisites of being human,” or 
mere “empty shells,” the easier for the tremendous individual, 
familial,29 and societal burdens30 of dementia to outweigh the 
 
frontotemporal dementia, id. at 123–24; ALS, id. at 130; or AIDS, MACE & RABINS, 
supra note 18, at 294–95. 
28 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 2. 
29 If the family members act as the caregivers, the toll on them is often overwhelming.  
See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 118 (discussing the importance of support 
groups for family members functioning as caregivers); Lisa Brodoff, Planning for 
Alzheimer’s Disease with Mental Health Advance Directives, 17 ELDER L.J. 239, 240 
(2010).  The literature is filled with descriptions of the stress on caregivers.  MARKUT & 
CRANE, supra note 18, at 160; see also BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 219–24; 
MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 235–36.  Intertwined with emotional stress are the 
huge economic pressures accompanying the care of the demented. 
 Total healthcare costs are more than three times higher for people with 
Alzheimer’s and other dementias than for other people age 65 and older . . . .  
. . . . 
 People with Alzheimer’s are high consumers of hospital, nursing home and 
other health and long-term care services, which translates into high costs for 
Medicare, Medicaid and millions of families.  As families struggle to survive in a 
deepening recession and as states grapple with budget shortfalls, Alzheimer’s 
disease threatens to overwhelm them both. . . . 
. . . In addition to the unpaid care families contribute, the report also reveals that 
Alzheimer’s creates high out-of-pocket health and long-term care expenses for 
families. 
Press Release, Alzheimer’s Ass’n, New Report Says Alzheimer’s Disease and Dementia 
Triple Healthcare Costs for Americans Age 65 and Older (Mar. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.alz.org/national/documents/release_032409_factsfigures.pdf. 
30 The current yearly cost to society of dementia is estimated to be one hundred billion 
dollars.  BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 3.  For a discussion of the nature and scope 
of the current stress on the health care system, see generally BILL BYTHEWAY, AGEISM 
52–55 (1995) (describing the presence of panic in a culture that the elderly will use up 
health care resources); SOMERVILLE, supra note 7, at 13; PAUL STARR, The SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION 
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concern for the fate of the demented person.  On the other hand, 
narratives positioning the demented as persons who, while perhaps 
diminished, remain fully human make it difficult to relegate this 
group to the realm of instrumental, cost-benefit analysis. 
Attaining the latter situation is vital.  Put simply, it is impossible to 
create a workable, legal regulatory regime regarding PAS and 
dementia.  Due to a fundamental paradox, consent is not possible, and 
use of living wills to resolve this issue will inevitably result in 
delegating unbounded discretion, as was once possessed by monarchs, 
over the life or death of the demented person.  But cultural blinders in 
the form of the myth of “the empty shell” impair our ability to see 
clearly the horrors that could accompany permitting PAS for 
dementia.  Rebuffing this myth, however, cannot be limited to the 
standard academic methods of analysis and authority, though there is 
much of that in this Article.  It also requires a visit into the day-to-day 
world, what some would call reality.  The call to reconceptualize the 
demented must be more than thoughtful and reflective; it must be 
vivid.  To that end, at various points in this Article I tell stories about 
my mother and her life with dementia. 
Part I of this Article explores the neurophysiological effects of 
dementia on the interrelated processes of memory, cognition, and 
language.  The section then explains how the neurological damage 
associated with dementia manifests in the daily life of the dementia 
sufferer.  Part II faces the myth of “the empty shell” head on—
exploring the myth, debunking it, and then explaining the need to 
curb the self-fulfilling institutional dynamics of “malignant 
positioning.”  Finally, Part III directly confronts the impossibility of 
creating a legal regime that can acceptably regulate PAS and 
dementia. 
 
AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 378 (1982); Dieter Giesen, Dilemmas at Life’s 
End: A Comparative Legal Perspective, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL 
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 200 (John Keown ed., 1995) [hereinafter EUTHANASIA 
EXAMINED]; Sheryl A. Russ, Care of the Older Person: The Ethical Challenge of 
American Medicine, 4 ISSUES L. & MED. 87, 88 (1989). 
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I 
THE SCIENCE AND RESULTING EFFECTS OF DEMENTIA 
A.  The Science of the Brain 
Dementia results from damage to the “neural architecture” of 
various areas of the brain.31  As a disease such as Alzheimer’s breaks 
down various aspects of the structure of brain cells,32 deficiencies in 
assorted neurotransmitters (chemicals that send messages from one 
cell to the next33) appear. 
The brain is the center of the interrelated processes of language, 
memory, and communication.34  Language is a system of symbols 
used to communicate;35 the system itself is composed of different 
varieties of knowledge.36  The dementia sufferer will experience 
different language deficits depending of the site of the neurological 
damage.37 
Linguistic communication requires more than access to language.  
It is also a result of cognition; specifically, it is a cognitive process of 
sharing ideas through language.38  Cognition, in turn, implicates 
stored knowledge as well as the processes for making and 
manipulating knowledge.  The human brain is a pattern recognition 
system.39  This system thus depends on memories stored in patterns,40 
and it is in the domain of memory41 where dementia-causing diseases 
do damage.42 
 
31 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 31; see also BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra 
note 1, at 69; Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
32 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 56–57. 
33 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 302. 
34 Id. at 23. 
35 See id. at 35. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 23. 
38 Meaningful communication requires the production and comprehension of ideas.  The 
act of speaking, in and of itself, does not constitute communication because that which is 
spoken may be structurally and semantically meaningless.  Nor does knowing the grammar 
of a language ensure the ability to communicate.  One can know the rules for combining 
sounds into words, and words with each other, without being able to intentionally 
communicate.  Communication occurs only when sounds and words have been structured 
in such a way that the idea of the speaker is derived by the listener.  Id. at 35–40. 
39 See id. at 23. 
40 See id. at 24. 
41 See id. at 28–29; Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 1. 
42 As such, dementia is one cause of aphasia, an “acquired impairment of language” 
from stroke, trauma, or disease.  See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 28. 
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Our many memory systems43 operate on different rules44 with 
distinct neural architecture.45  Sensory memory holds information 
from our senses long enough so that other brain systems can review 
that data for further processing.46  Short-term memory refers to the 
amount of information that can be held in consciousness.47  Contrary 
to those who use the term to refer to any information obtained in the 
past few years (“We went to that restaurant less than a year ago and I 
can’t even remember where it was located—where has my short-term 
memory gone?”), short-term memory does not refer to information 
that recently fell from consciousness.  Once a memory is no longer in 
consciousness, even if it was three minutes ago, it resides in long-
term memory.48 
Working memory is active; it is what you are thinking about 
now.49  Working memory also exhibits an active, decision-making 
aspect—the so-called “central executive.”50 
 To interpret new information, we rely on previous experience.  
Thus, working memory must activate past experience and bring that 
knowledge to consciousness.  Generally, decisions must be made 
about the new information the organism is receiving.  Baddeley 
called the decision-making component of working memory the 
central executive.  The central executive system focuses attention, 
encodes information, retrieves information from long-term stores, 
plans action, and solves problems.51 
A different aspect of memory, semantic memory, stores concepts.52  
Within semantic memory one finds schema—“an attentional set 
formed by the simultaneous activation of a group of related 
concepts”53—that we carry for a seemingly endless set of activities 
(e.g., we have schema for eating at a Chinese restaurant, going 
through security at an airport, putting gas in an automobile, using a 
cell phone, etc.).54 
 
43 Id. at 37. 
44 Id. at 38. 
45 Id. at 50. 
46 Id. at 37–38. 
47 Id. at 38–39. 
48 Id. at 39. 
49 Id. at 38. 
50 Id. at 39. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 40. 
53 Id. at 41. 
54 Id. 
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This accounts for how a person with advanced Alzheimer’s can 
walk straight into a piece of furniture even though the brain clearly 
perceives it.  Semantic memory simply did not retrieve the concept of 
furniture or the related schema of how to move through a furnished 
space.55  I got a sense of this phenomenon last year.  I ran a red light 
(fortunately, no other cars were present).  I looked at the light and 
plainly saw it was red, but in that instant, my brain did not retrieve the 
construct that seeing a red orb equals applying pressure to the brake. 
Episodic memory contains events (e.g., I met my son for coffee 
yesterday, I covered propensity evidence in last Thursday’s class, my 
wife and I spent our anniversary away at the ocean last month).56  
Lexical memory contains words,57 while nondeclarative memory 
guides motor skills so one does not have to constantly learn how to 
walk or tie one’s shoes.58 
Dementia compromises all memory systems; damage to the frontal 
lobe and systems providing input to the frontal lobe is common.  
Thus, the person with Alzheimer’s loses working and episodic 
memory first, followed by loss of semantic memory.59 
B.  The Effect on the Individual Resulting from Damage to the Brain 
by Dementia-Causing Disease 
Any discussion of the effect and impact of a dementia-causing 
disease on the individual necessarily proceeds in the form of 
generalization.  We are talking about individuals.  People with 
dementia do not exhibit all the symptomology that reports of 
caregivers associate with dementia, and those behaviors the individual 
does manifest do not often last for the entire term of the disease.60  In 
fact, many are temporary, although often followed by new, equally 
difficult behavior.61  That said, there are common patterns 
nonetheless. 
 
55 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 108. 
56 BAYLES & TOMEDA, supra note 1, at 42. 
57 Id. at 51. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 5, 69. 
60 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 66; BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 36 
(explaining that the precise cognitive-communication deficits will partly be a function of 
the area of the brain damaged); MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 23 (discussing that 
different cognitive abilities are affected “unevenly,” and consequently, the person with 
dementia is able to do some things competently, but not others). 
61 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 66. 
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Consider the implications of the previous section for the dementia 
sufferer. 
The production and comprehension of language cannot be separated 
from cognition.  Rather, communication is a manifestation of 
cognition.  Persons with dementia have trouble producing linguistic 
information because they have trouble thinking and generating and 
ordering ideas, in part because information-processing capabilities 
of declarative and working memory systems are disturbed, in part 
because of degradation of knowledge.  These same individuals have 
difficulty comprehending language because of deficits in the 
cognitive processes of perception, recognition, attention, 
inferencing memory, and degradation of knowledge.62 
For those in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease (which this 
Article will focus on because it is the most common cause of 
dementia), the episodic memory constantly fails—getting lost while 
walking or on a drive,63 forgetting to take medicine, forgetting what 
they were talking about, repeating the same story they told an hour 
ago.  Lexical memory’s degradation leaves a formerly articulate 
person struggling to find appropriate words64 with increasing use of 
imprecise “empty words” like “thing” and “it.”65  Asking where a 
family member with dementia placed a red enamel Dutch oven may 
in the course of a lexical struggle emerge as “the red cooking thing.”  
This experience is described by dementia sufferers: 
For a while, I’ll search for a word and I can see it walking away 
from me.  It gets littler and littler.  It always comes back, but at the 
wrong time.  You can’t be spontaneous. 
. . . . 
I really can’t converse very well at all.  So that’s very limiting.  I 
can’t think of things to say before somebody’s already said it and 
they’ve superseded what I have to say.  The words get tangled very 
easily and I get frustrated when I can’t think of a word.  Every time 
I converse with somebody, there’s always some word I can’t 
remember.  I really cuss when I can’t remember a word. 
. . . . 
 
62 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 47. 
63 Id. at 42; see also id. at 47 (explaining that those with dementia forget what they just 
heard, read, or thought). 
64 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 35; see also BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra 
note 1, at 60 (stating that in mid-stage Alzheimer’s, the difficulty of finding words 
becomes more obvious in spontaneous speech). 
65 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 66. 
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I’m aware that I’m losing larger and larger chunks of memory...  I 
lose one word and then I can’t come up with the rest of the 
sentence.  I just stop talking and people think something is really 
wrong with me.66 
Imagine how upsetting it would be to watch the progressive loss of 
your competencies,67 to give up your independence (e.g., being 
denied the right to drive),68 your responsibilities and accompanying 
social roles,69 and your positions of leadership in the family.70  Not 
surprisingly, the demented individual starts to exhibit anger, 
irritability, and confusion and becomes frightened.71 
Usually at this time of the school year, when I come home from 
work, Martha has changed out of her school clothes, has a load of 
laundry in the washer, dinner on the stove, and is finishing scoring 
the tests of the children she worked with today.  But lately the scene 
is different.  When I come in, she is sitting at the table in her school 
clothes.  There is no laundry going, nothing on the stove.  Piles of 
crumpled papers surround her on the table and floor on which she 
has unsuccessfully tried to record and compute test scores.  She has 
been unable to use the charts and do the straightforward 
computations that she has done for years.  She is frustrated, angry, 
frightened.  She shouts; she cries.  I help her do the calculations and 
even rewrite some of the summaries she has struggled with.  She 
calms down somewhat but is still very upset.  “What’s wrong with 
me?” she asks.  I can’t answer because I don’t know, but we both 
know that something is very wrong, and we are afraid.72 
Also not surprisingly, persons with dementia become increasingly 
unsure, losing the sense that they can trust themselves in the world.  
All they want is for things to be normal again, to be like how they 
were.73 
Being unsure is an experience wherein people can no longer take 
themselves for granted in how they are in the world.74  They are 
 
66 Lisa Snyder, Personhood and Interpersonal Communication in Dementia, in 
DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 259, 261 (citations omitted) (quoting various accounts). 
67 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 30; Catherine Oppenheimer, I Am, Thou Art: 
Personal Identity in Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 193, 197. 
68 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 84–88; Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 
197. 
69 See Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 197 (observing that dementia takes away the 
individual’s previously held social roles). 
70 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 142. 
71 See id. at 207. 
72 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 3. 
73 See id. at 12. 
74 Phinney, supra note 18, at 11. 
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often unsure of themselves and are not fully at ease as they live 
their day-to-day lives . . . .75 
In the middle stage of Alzheimer’s, the individual changes most 
dramatically, “becoming more dependent on others for survival.”76  
The person becomes disoriented as to place in addition to time,77 not 
recognizing where he or she is. Increasingly, the deficits in various 
memory systems make spontaneous speech more and more difficult78 
and interfere with the ability to comprehend and retain explanations.79  
Without a competent executive function in working memory, the 
person can no longer make plans and act on them.80  For even in the 
unlikely event such a plan was made, working memory would be 
unable to retrieve it from long-term memory. 
With a loss of orientation as to space, the familiar becomes alien.  
It is no wonder dementia sufferers begin to hoard and hide food.81  
They are surrounded by strangers they do not understand.  Paranoia—
accusing family of stealing possessions82—makes complete sense.  
You do not remember where you put or hid some possession, and do 
not recall some family member’s explanation an hour earlier about 
where it had gone.83  At some point in the disease, it becomes very 
hard to make a person feel safe in that person’s own home.84 
 A person’s feelings also affect his behavior.  The person with 
dementia probably feels lost, worried, anxious, vulnerable, and 
helpless much of the time.  He may also be aware that he fails at 
tasks and feel that he is making a fool of himself.  Imagine what it 
must feel like to want to say something nice to your caregiver but 
all that comes out are curse words.  Think how frightening it must 
be if a familiar home and familiar people now seem strange and 
unfamiliar.85 
 
75 Id. 
76 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 65. 
77 Id. 
78 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67; Snyder, supra note 66, at 261. 
79 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 38; see also id. at 25 (explaining that a 
demented person will only comprehend or recall part of a conversation and then act on that 
part, responding to what they think was said). 
80 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 28; MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 84. 
81 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 68, 133. 
82 Id. at 155. 
83 Id. at 159–60; see also id. at 38 (describing that it becomes increasingly difficult for 
the demented individual to understand explanation). 
84 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 119. 
85 MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 24. 
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During the late stages of Alzheimer’s, the individual can become 
disoriented as to person (i.e., does not know who he or she is),86 as 
well as place and time.  The sufferer might be unable to speak more 
than one or two words87 “and may recognize no one or only one or 
two people.”88  This person will be unable to walk, having lost 
nondeclarative memory89 or to care for themselves in any way.90  
“There is incontinence of bladder and bowel. Intellect is devastated 
by a global failure of working and declarative memory systems and 
individuals are unable to carry out basic ADLs,”91 forgetting even 
how to swallow or eat.92 
In the end, the nervous system fails, resulting in death.93  The 
cause of death is dementia.94 
II 
EXPOSING THE CULTURAL BLINDERS THAT IMPAIR OUR ABILITY TO 
PERCEIVE THE REALITY OF PAS AND DEMENTIA—THE MYTH, 
REJECTING THE MYTH, AND COMBATING SELF-FULFILLING 
DYNAMICS 
A.  The Myth of the “Empty Shell” 
It is common for people in our culture to see the severely demented 
as being dead or as good as dead.95  Intelligent people have described 
 
86 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67. 
87 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 36. 
88 Id. at 291; MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 56 (discussing that demented 
individuals may get to the “point where they do not recognize the people around them”). 
89 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 90–92. 
90 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67 (explaining that demented individuals 
“are unable to carry out basic ADLs”). 
91 “ADLs” refers to “activities of daily living” (dressing, bathing, grooming, and such).  
See Elaine M. Brody et al., Excess Disabilities of Mentally Impaired Aged: Impact of 
Individualized Treatment, 25 GERONTOLOGIST 124, 127 (1971).  For further description of 
early-stage dementia, see A.F. JORM, THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND 
RELATED DISORDERS 26–27 (1990). 
92 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 72. 
93 Id. at 113. 
94 Id. at 114; see also id. at 291 (explaining that the natural progression of Alzheimer’s 
disease usually ends in death).  It is difficult, however, to determine the point at which the 
Alzheimer’s sufferer becomes “terminal.”  See id. 
95 Alison Phinney, Fluctuating Awareness and the Breakdown of the Illness Narrative 
in Dementia, 1 DEMENTIA 329, 338–40 (2002); see also A. Harry Lesser, Dementia and 
Personal Identity, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 55, 57 (explaining caregivers say things 
like “[h]e’s not there any more”); Eric Matthews, Dementia and the Identity of the Person, 
in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 163, 163. 
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the demented as being no more than an empty shell or living a 
cabbage-like existence.96 
 Those suffering from severe dementia are easily viewed as mere 
“shells” of their former selves.  Philosopher John Arras has made 
use of this metaphor to describe an elderly demented woman: 
“Unfortunately, she appears to have been reduced to a mere shell of 
her former self.  She can no longer reason, communicate (except in 
the most rudimentary, reflexive manner), relate to her family, or 
experience the manifestations of love.”  Arras concludes that she 
“continues to have biological life, but her biographical life has 
come to an end.”97 
Think about what these public sentiments really mean.  Beaches 
are littered with empty shells.  Perhaps we will take note of a 
particularly shiny or pretty one, but it is still just an empty shell.  We 
could as easily ignore it, try to skip it along the water, or step on it 
and crush it.  It is just an empty shell.  Now think about the “life” of a 
cabbage.  It is a vegetable.  It sits on the ground, rooted in dirt, and 
rots unless we choose to pick it and dice it for coleslaw.  We feel no 
emotion, no feeling in connection with a cabbage.  This idea that the 
human “self” is lost with dementia pervades our culture. 
 The loss of mind in ‘dementia’ reflects the common and 
distressing observation by relatives, carers, and doctors that ‘self’ is 
lost slowly as the illness progresses.  The scientific and popular 
literature has largely reflected this concept with books such as The 
Loss of Self (Cohen & Eisdorfer 2001) or Alzheimer’s Disease: 
Coping with a Living Death (Woods 1989).  Films like Iris, . . . 
showing the deterioration of the author and philosopher Iris 
Murdoch, and media reports describing the illness of the late US 
 
96 Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 9. 
97 Post, supra note 21, at 715 (quoting John D. Arras, The Severely Demented, 
Minimally Functional Patient: An Ethical Analysis, 36 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 938, 941 
(1988)).  Some philosophers have viewed the severely demented as mere “shells,” 
individuals who possess “biological life,” not “biographical life.”  See id.; JAMES 
RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE: THE MORALITY OF EUTHANASIA 50 (1986) (sharing the 
view that only biographical life has the quality of a true life worthy of moral 
consideration). 
 In response to Arras and Rachels, Stephen G. Post argues: 
“A mere shell” implies that there is nothing present within, but the metaphor 
obscures the continued presence of the patient’s affective core and the 
uncertainties of determining radical cognitive devastation.  Severely demented 
older persons are, after all, neither brain dead nor in a persistent vegetative state.  
We might wonder, and not incidentally, whether cognition is any more important 
than affection in determining personhood. 
Post, supra note 21, at 716. 
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President Ronald Reagan, have continued to reinforce the idea of 
the annihilation of self in people’s minds.98 
We are a culture of youth, where the latest techno-toy is what 
matters.  In this world of “new-worship,” the aging already tend to be 
devalued.99  On top of this so-called ageism is the widely held 
cultural narrative of the inevitable journey of the demented from 
father, mother, friend, child, mentor, and worker to empty shell and 
cabbage.  There would seem to be little sense in constraining the 
notion of permitting PAS for these (otherwise extremely expensive) 
cabbages and shells. 
This cultural belief system, moreover, does not merely rest on fear 
and misconception.  In the realm of the philosophy of psychiatry,100 
the empty shell myth finds support in a number of philosophical101 
and psychological102 theories.  It is the philosophy of John Locke, 
 
98 Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 144 (footnote omitted). 
99 See BYTHEWAY, supra note 30, at 14, 30–31; Bavidge, supra note 2, at 48.  For an 
analysis explaining why the concept that old age is a “second childhood” is both 
conceptually incorrect and culturally demeaning, see Harry Cayton, From Childhood to 
Childhood? Autonomy and Dependence Through the Ages of Life, in DEMENTIA, supra 
note 2, at 277, 285. 
100 See generally DEMENTIA, supra note 2 (presenting an anthology of recent thoughts 
of major figures in the field of the philosophy of psychiatry). 
101 Philosophically, Cartesians would find no problem, given the fundamental concept 
of “I think, therefore I am,” to conclude within their conception of mind-body dualism that 
if the mind fails, the self ceases to exist.  See ANTHONY KENNY, THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MIND 17 (1989); Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 151.  For the modern dualist 
stance, see Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 8. 
 A similar conclusion is reached by Kantian philosopher Michael Luntley, albeit by a 
different analysis.  For Luntley, the self is that which “keep[s] track of things.”  See 
Michael Luntley, Keeping Track, Autobiography, and the Conditions for Self-Erosion, in 
DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 105, 106.  For Luntley, saying “I” may be evidence of, but not 
sufficient for, personal identity.  Id. at 106–07.  But see Steven R. Sabat & Rom Harré, The 
Construction and Deconstruction of Self in Alzheimer’s Disease, 12 AGEING & SOCIETY 
443, 445–47 (1998) (explaining that the “self,” as represented by the lexical “I,” is formal 
and not dependent on memory).  If the use of “I” becomes merely a habit, this will be 
reflected in discourse.  See id. at 443 (explaining that empirical evidence indicates that the 
self “persists far into the end stage of the disease”). 
 For Luntley, these “things” are selected and ordered according to the “point of view” of 
the self or “I.”  See Luntley, supra, at 110. 
 If, in theory, one could no longer “keep track of things” (as might be the case in later 
stages of dementia), the self would cease to exist.  Id. at 106.  But see supra note 97 and 
accompanying text. 
102 In the field of cognivist psychology, all meaning making takes place inside the skull 
of the individual.  See ALAN J. PARKIN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 3 (1996); see also Tim Thornton, The Discursive Turn, Social 
Constructionism, and Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 123.  Cognitivists can also 
accept many postmodern concepts involving social construction of meaning.  They accept 
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however, that provides the most commonly relied upon intellectual 
support for the empty shell myth. 
For Locke, it was not sufficient that the subject had a biological 
existence or even was a thinking entity (for animals also think).103  A 
person must be capable of self-reflection104 or, at least to some 
degree, self-knowledge.  Locke defined a “person” as a “thinking 
intelligent being [that] can consider itself as itself, the same thinking 
thing, in different times and places.”105 
Under this definition, when, as occurs with severe dementia, one 
loses memory of a self in different places in time and even loses 
orientation as to person,106 the individual ceases to be a person.107  
Modern Lockeans108 rely upon Locke’s notion of a person to deny 
personhood to individuals in a persistent vegetative state.109 
 
that mental states or meanings are caused by social factors.  Id. at 126.  Ultimately, 
however, for a cognitive psychologist, the effects of such social influences are “mediated 
by what happens within the skull.”  Id.  Thus, to the extent that under this psychological 
theory everything happens inside the skull (i.e., the brain), as the brain fails so does the 
existence of the self whose inner world is shutting down. 
103 See Matthews, supra note 95, at 165. 
104 See E. Jonathan Lowe, Can the Self Disintegrate? Personal Identity, 
Psychopathology, and Disunities of Consciousness, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 89, 94; 
Matthews, supra note 95, at 165.  For modern Lockeans, “persons” are those capable of 
appreciating their own value.  See generally JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE (1985); 
John Harris, A Philosophical Case Against the Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in 
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 30, at 36, 40–41; John Harris, Euthanasia and the 
Value of Life, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 30, at 6 [hereinafter Harris, The 
Value of Life]; John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A 
Legal Analysis, in DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA 139, 174–75 (Dennis J. Horan & 
David Mall eds., 1977); Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, in DEATH, DYING, AND 
EUTHANASIA, supra, at 293, 295; PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE 
COLLAPSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL ETHICS 183 (1994); Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, For 
Sometimes Letting—and Helping—Die, 14 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 149 (1986); Van 
Rensselaer Potter, On Dying with Personhood, in EUTHANASIA: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
COMPANION, at 24–26 (Lisa Yount ed., 2002). 
105 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 285. (Peter H. 
Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (1690). 
106 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 67. 
107 See Jennifer Radden & Joan M. Fordyce, Into the Darkness: Losing Identity with 
Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 71, 71. 
108 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 104, at 180, 197–98; Harris, The Value of Life, supra 
note 104, at 9. 
109 See SINGER, supra note 104, at 192, 206–07; Harris, The Value of Life, supra note 
104, at 18. 
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B.  Rejecting the Myth 
1.  Lessons from Experience 
a.  A Fuller View of the Demented 
Among caregivers who work with the demented, increasing 
numbers report that they do not find any correspondence between the 
individuals for whom they care and the crude cultural, metaphorical 
characterizations used like empty shell and cabbage-like.  Even when 
seriously demented, a person can find sources of joy and pleasure.110  
“A dementing illness does not suddenly end a person’s capacity to 
experience love or joy, nor does it end her ability to laugh.”111  Like 
many persons with even severe dementia, my mother took great joy in 
listening to music112 and the weekly visits of a friendly dog that was 
brought to the care facility where she lived.113 
Caregivers consistently report that they are aware of a “self” in 
even severely demented individuals.114  In the first place, even those 
with more advanced forms of dementia have relatively lucid 
moments.115  Particular circumstances or certain times of day may 
allow a person with memory loss to seem more normal.116  As one 
family member with a father-in-law who suffered from dementia 
noted: 
In the few minutes after leaving the Family Alliance day program, 
when I was driving home with Mike, he would make comments or 
talk to me in a perfectly normal manner, just like it was you and me, 
perfectly normal.  It would be just for those few minutes and then it 
was gone.  I really treasured those few moments.117 
 
110 SINGER, supra note 104, at 132–34, 299, 370; see also Sanford H. Kadish, Letting 
Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857, 887 (1992) (observing 
there is value to the experiences in a demented person’s life); cf. Robertson, supra note 
104, at 176 (explaining that an insane person is still regarded as a “specific” person). 
111 MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 213. 
112 See Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 198. 
113 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 204 (explaining that positive results are 
seen when demented persons are provided “something to nurture,” such as pets or plants). 
114 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 145. 
115 Id.; cf. Stephen G. Post, Respectare: Moral Respect for the Lives of the Deeply 
Forgetful, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 223, 230 (noting that a demented person might 
find coherence in “another time” that can be recalled). 
116 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 178. 
117 Id. 
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Perhaps dementia is akin to an electrical short where at times you 
shake the wire just right and the bulb goes on.118  There were a few 
times during visits with my mother in her Alzheimer’s residence 
when, for ten or fifteen minutes, we had a relatively normal 
conversation, punctuated with mom’s laughter at the existential 
absurdity of her condition.119  Other times, her conversation was 
gibberish.  Could a coherent mom have been trapped inside, generally 
unable to communicate in expressed language because of the 
devastation to the systems making such forms of communication 
possible?  At the time I would have said that such a possibility was 
highly unlikely.  But I have since come across a case study that gives 
me pause.  In this study, the dementia patient was given antidementia 
drugs.  In her case, the results were spectacular.  From living an 
existence that many would equate with a cabbage—
noncommunicative and seemingly unaware of her environment—the 
patient regained her communicative faculties.120  When she did, she 
was able to recall in detail what had transpired while she was 
supposedly an empty shell.121  Was there something unique about her 
disease?  Might she have been misdiagnosed, suffering from 
something else that mimicked dementia?122  Who can know?  
Nonetheless, it serves as a cautionary tale to the practice of quickly 
categorizing the severely demented as all but inanimate objects. 
Beyond issues of what is called rational cognition, caregivers are 
adamant about feeling a “sense of humanity” in even the most 
severely demented.123  Demented persons, regardless of how they 
may score on tests measuring their cognitive, word, and language 
 
118 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 39. 
119 As to the demented person’s awareness of the condition, see Thornton, supra note 
102, at 130.  See also Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 151 (“It is certainly the case 
that people with dementia can be aware of the loss of their capacities and of aspects of 
their inner selves.”).  Iris Murdoch spoke of herself as “sailing into the darkness.”  JOHN 
BAYLEY, IRIS: A MEMOIR OF IRIS MURDOCH 179 (1998).  But see Phinney, supra note 95, 
at 330 (explaining that a demented person’s awareness of their symptoms fluctuates–
sometimes they are aware that they are forgetful, other times not). 
120 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 150. 
121 Id. 
122 Illness or depression can exacerbate the symptoms of dementia.  See MACE & 
RABINS, supra note 18, at 293, 310.  In fact, even without dementia, depression alone can 
affect memory.  Id. at 6.  Additionally, some treatable conditions, such as delirium or 
thyroid problems, can seem like or even cause temporary dementia.  See id. at 9–10, 14. 
123 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 145. 
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skills, have “an emotional and relational reality,”124 retaining the 
ability to make compassionate connections.125 
The reality is that until the very advanced and even terminal stage 
of dementia, the person with dementia will usually have 
sporadically articulated memories of deeply meaningful events and 
relationships ensconced in long-term memory . . . . Even in the 
advanced stage of dementia . . . one finds varying degrees of 
emotional and relational expression, remnants of personality, and 
even meaningful non-verbal communication (as in the reaching out 
for a hug).126 
In fact, those with dementia retain many of their capacities until the 
very final stages of the disease.  In early-stage Alzheimer’s, the 
individual generally has good recognition memory, can follow a 
three-stage command, can sustain attention and selectively attend to 
stimuli, has semantic knowledge intact, can read and comprehend at 
the sentence level, and can independently perform basic ADLs (using 
the toilet, bathing, feeding, etc.).127  In middle-stage Alzheimer’s, the 
person can follow a two-step command; can sustain attention for 
limited amounts of time in a low distraction environment; has fair 
recognition memory; has good grammar, syntax, and social language; 
can reminisce about tangible stimuli; can comprehend simple 
statements, yes or no questions, and most choice questions; and 
generally is able to perform basic ADLs with minimal assistance.128  
Even at late-stage Alzheimer’s, where dementia is severe, the person 
can generally recognize his or her own name; often can contribute to a 
conversation; may attend to positive stimuli for short periods; retains 
some aspects of social language (greetings, leave taking, responding 
to a compliment); may answer simple yes or no and choice questions; 
and may feed himself or herself with minimal assistance.129 
 
124 See Post, supra note 115, at 232. 
125 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 175. 
126 Id. at 231; see also Guy A.M. Widdershoven & Ron L.P. Berghmans, Meaning-
Making in Dementia: A Hermeneutic Perspective, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 179, 179 
(stating that until very late in the progression of the disease, the demented person can 
manipulate objects, react to others, and make meaning through expressed moods). 
127 See supra note 90. 
128 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 223; see also Joseph M. Foley, The 
Experience of Being Demented, in DEMENTIA AND AGING: ETHICS, VALUES, AND POLICY 
CHOICES 30–43 (Robert H. Binstock et al. eds., 1992). 
129 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 223; see also Barry Reisberg et al., The Final 
Stage of Alzheimer’s Disease: Issues for the Patient, Family, and Professional 
Community, in ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND RELATED DISORDERS: PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES 
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While these quotes and citations about the full humanity of the 
dementia sufferer counter the empty shell myth, they do so in an 
analysis removed from the three-dimensional reality of life with 
dementia.  They lack texture and color; they do not put us face to face 
with a real human being.  Yet it is the lives of real humans that the 
insidious myth of the empty shell directly impacts.  Therefore, I tell a 
portion of my mother’s story to remedy this deficiency in my attack 
on the myth.130 
One caution: The human experience unfolds in the prose of 
narrative; the academic do so in the language of analysis and 
authority.  So the reader must now be prepared for a shift from the 
academic into the narrative, and then back again into the academic. 
The Story Begins: Mom Loses It 
Mom’s confusion about when or where things happened and who 
was there when they did, as well as her increasing tendency to 
suddenly use total nonsense words (“I think it’s under the ‘flebus.’”), 
must have been very frustrating and frightening for her, although 
publicly she dealt with her mental slips by laughing at herself.  But it 
was no laughing matter. 
I can only imagine what it would be like for some person I did not 
know who was undergoing the experience of watching her mind 
breaking down, day by day.  Mom, however, I knew.  She was 
extremely bright, extremely capable.  A straight “A” student who had 
secret dreams of medical school, but instead became a housewife.  
The path of her life was in part the result of her times and the narrow 
range of expectations foisted on women in America in the 1940s.  But 
it was more complex than that.  I was around seventeen-years-old 
when I inadvertently came across a box of clippings while cleaning a 
closet.  To my utter amazement, my demanding, seemingly humdrum 
suburban mom, with whom I constantly butted heads over the exalted 
trivialities of teen existence, had been a ballerina when she met dad.  
And she’d been a great ballerina—rave reviews from the Paris Opera 
where she had been the youngest American to ever dance solo, and 
 
FOR THE PATIENT, FAMILY, STAFF, AND COMMUNITY 5, 12–16 (Richard Mayeux et al. 
eds., 1998). 
130 I also tell her story because, for reasons analogous to the methodology of the 
emerging feminist movement, it is important that such stories—those of dementia—be 
told.  See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and 
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1634 (1991) (discussing the centrality of 
storytelling in the feminist movement). 
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equal plaudits from her performance at the Hollywood Bowl.  And the 
pictures.  Mom looked like a 1930’s movie star.  Amazing. 
Then, in her sixties, Mom suffered a serious heart attack.  She 
recovered but she no longer had her ability to accurately calculate 
rows of figures in her head.  This was the first of a progression of 
increasingly serious cognitive blows. 
Within a year or so, Mom was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease.  
Her increasing confusion, thus, was always attributed to some aspect 
of her disease or her treatment.  Her Sinimet was not the right 
dosage, her Parkinson’s and high blood pressure meds were 
intersecting, she ate too soon after taking the meds, she ate too late 
after taking the meds, she ate protein in the morning (Dad’s private 
theory), and on and on.  Anything, but anything, was used other than 
the possibility that Mom was losing her mind.  And it was happening 
for a far, far longer period of time than I realized.  My sister Kathy 
knew long before me after a Florida visit in which Mom hadn’t really 
recognized her the first day.  It was Mom’s meds, the story went.  
Always her meds.  But Kathy was skeptical.  Dad was covering for 
her, but it was not so obvious.  The problem was that Dad always had 
the annoying habit of speaking for Mom in regular conversation, even 
when Mom was just fine.  Mom, of course, would give him “the look.”  
That was their shtick.  So, it was easy for Dad to cover in our weekly 
phone conversations.  Mom would be on the phone, but dad would 
say, “Your Mom did this or that—didn’t you dear.”  This was 
annoying, but not unusual, particularly since Mom did not talk much 
anyway, even in person. 
The news in 1995 that Dad possibly had fourth-stage pancreatic 
cancer pushed her over the edge.  He was her constant companion of 
fifty-two years, her caretaker, and her organizer.  He loved Mom, 
rarely leaving her side.  He cooked, cleaned, dressed Mom, shopped, 
paid bills, dealt with investments, organized their social life, dealt 
with her medications, led her through her daily physical exercise, and 
made her do memory problems to keep her mind going.  Mom fully 
understood what the diagnosis of pancreatic cancer meant.  She was 
not stupid, even as she became more confused.  She saw things for 
what they were: she was very sick, and her life companion was dying. 
Even after we all knew dad was dying, Mom would still 
communicate, and, at times, was clever and intelligent; however, she 
was terrified, distracted, and confused to an extent far beyond how 
she had been a few weeks before.  I have in my memory what was, for 
me, an unforgettable image of Mom losing it.  Shortly after my folks’ 
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arrival in Tacoma, Washington, where my wonderful wife Eva and I 
had brought Mom and Dad to live after the initial diagnosis of 
cancer, we went out to dinner with my wife’s huge family, the whole 
Beatty clan.  Mom sat next to Eva’s mom, Bea.  Mom loved Bea, and 
Bea loved Mom.  Even today, Bea sometimes wears Mom’s red winter 
coat “just because it makes me feel like she’s close by.”  Mom also 
loved food, had loved eating for as long as I remember.  Perhaps this 
was a lifelong reaction to food deprivation during her dancing days.  
But at this dinner, Mom went beyond any norm.  For, all of a sudden, 
there was Mom eating the food off of Bea’s plate with her hands, 
totally oblivious to all but the primal desire for food.  Even so, we all 
attributed this incident to shock—the terrible news, suddenly being 
snatched from her home, and such.  It would be quite awhile before 
we faced the truth: Mom had dementia. 
Fast Forward a Year: The Alzheimer’s Residence 
Over the course of the next year, we moved Mom in and out of 
three assisted-living facilities.131  While each had its own story, the 
bottom line was the same: none was equipped to deal with a resident 
who was both very mobile and very demented.  Finally on the fourth 
try, we got it right. 
The best thing we ever did for Mom was to move her into a nearby 
residence specifically built, organized, and staffed to serve the needs 
of residents who had dementia.  Mom had her own room along a 
short corridor of similar rooms.  Three similar corridors joined my 
mother’s corridor, spokes funneling into a huge central circle.  The 
circle in turn contained an open dining area, kitchen, and a beautiful 
common area with comfortable chairs and couches, a television, a 
cassette player for music, and a huge stone fireplace.  Mom thought 
she lived in a “lovely lodge,” and I guess she did. 
Unlike any of the previous residences, this was a noninstitutional 
institution.  Breakfast, lunch, and dinner were served at regular 
hours, but, if you didn’t want to get up, that was fine.  You could have 
breakfast at 2:00 p.m.  You could have snacks whenever you wanted, 
and they’d keep stashes of the “private treats” that we bought for 
Mom and dole them out when she requested. 
Most significantly, the entire staff was a well-trained, well-
educated, relatively mature group who truly understood dementia.  
Concerned and compassionate, they just laughed when Mom, who 
 
131 It is common for those with dementia to go through several placements.  See 
MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 120–21. 
 2009] Physician-Assisted Suicide and Dementia 1109 
was generally very sweet and funny and genuinely loved by the staff, 
would open her mouth, and out would come, “Get over here, fat ass.”  
They were knowledgeable; they understood.  Mom was demented.  
They weren’t about to take moments like that seriously. 
Mom was very happy.  The staff played with her, fed her, teased 
her, hugged and comforted her, kept her clean, and did her hair—a 
lovely, lovely lodge (expensive, but no more so than the previous 
three residences). 
And Mom had friends, though their conversations would resemble 
two televisions on different channels facing each other.  The women 
“shopped” together.  They would get dressed up, grab their purses, 
and catch the bus to the stores.  (I learned this from asking a group of 
women who were standing together in the residence how they were 
doing.  “Fine.”  One said, “But we have to go now, our bus is here.”  
The rest of the women nodded.)  Then they’d go down the corridors 
and peek in unlocked rooms (once, one such shopper, while pointing 
to a particular room, told Eva, “I wouldn’t waste your time there, 
nothing really to buy—and what there is, is too expensive.”). 
Also, Mom loved animals, and Mom loved music.  Once a week, to 
Mom’s delight, they’d bring a dog by, and once a week musical 
performers would entertain the demented audience.  It was quite 
wonderful. 
When I’d visit, women would come up to me and start talking, 
thinking I was their son or some other relation.  The men (sadly, some 
younger than me) would take me aside to let me know that I could 
count on them completely if I “ever needed insurance” or “needed 
help even with my investment portfolio.”  They continued the lives 
they had known. 
Mom wouldn’t always recognize me when I came in (whether the 
result of the dementia or the fact she somehow lost her glasses when 
she moved in, I cannot say).  But when she heard my voice, even from 
a considerable distance, she’d stand up, look around, and say, “I 
hear Johnny’s voice.” 
A few times, we had conversations that were both coherent and 
fairly in touch with reality.  Other times, she’d be confused and would 
laugh and laugh at how out of it she was.  It was strange, like her 
coherent self was taking a bemused look at her demented self.  We 
took her out for ice cream a few times, and it was fun for her.  But it 
was also extremely difficult to get in and out of the car, and she often 
got disoriented and upset when we returned. 
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She’d laugh when I’d read through the postcards and letters my 
sister, Kathy, regularly sent her—”That little devil, Kathy, she’s a 
pistol, isn’t she?”  Often, she was totally coherent; it’s just that she 
was what could be fairly characterized as a psychological time 
traveler.  One day, she was with Dad in the war; another, going out 
for an evening at a club with a group of young friends in the 1950s; 
or she would relate a discussion she “just” had with a 1960s 
neighbor. 
I also saw my Mom in love.  One time, Eva and I came into the 
main room.  Mom was sitting by herself in a big soft chair, a 
mischievous grin on her face.  “I’ve got a secret.”  Her entire voice 
and affect was of a young woman.  Finally, we worked through the 
coyness and giggles and found out that she had just gotten engaged to 
my father.  It was 1941, and she was a twenty-four-year-old girl in 
love.  Amazing, to see my own mother in love. 
Mom Reaches the End 
In her second year at the Alzheimer’s residence, Mom developed 
ulcers on several parts of her body.  As much as the specialist and the 
residence staff tried, and they tried very hard, they could not get the 
ulcers under control.  Mom had trouble walking and she had trouble 
getting comfortable when lying down.  She lived in constant pain, 
moaning and whimpering.  It was really heartbreaking. 
She also stopped eating.  The staff tried to feed her the best they 
could, but, within a relatively short time, Mom lost between forty and 
fifty pounds, back to her weight when she was an eighteen-year-old 
dancer.  That’s part of the final course of Alzheimer’s.  People, even 
people who loved food as much as Mom, stop eating.  Maybe they 
lose interest, maybe they forget how, or maybe a little of both. 
As Mom’s pain continued, essentially unabated, we decided to have 
her taken to the hospital for treatment.  The residence arranged for 
an ambulance.  When the ambulance arrived and Mom was wheeled 
out, she was in a happy mood, waving goodbye to everyone.  When I 
met the ambulance twenty minutes later and they wheeled Mom out, 
she was completely unresponsive.  She was the same when they set 
her up in a room.  She never regained consciousness, dying within the 
week. 
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b.  Non-Lockean Philosophy and Noncognitive Psychology Buttress 
the View that Most Persons with Dementia Are Fully Persons Who 
Retain a Personal Identity 
Locke’s view of what constitutes a “person” has long been attacked 
on its own terms. For Locke, self-awareness is the essence of being a 
person, but as other scholars have pointed out, even the most extreme 
narcissist does not think of himself or herself all of the time.132  
Logically, for there to be a self upon which to reflect, there must 
already have been a self in existence prior to that reflection.133  As a 
result, the “self” cannot solely be a product of that reflection.  Also, 
there is nothing to explain why one would collect the particular 
bundle of ideas that constitute self-awareness to store in one’s brain in 
the first place.  What would give these ideas preferential meaning?  
What accounts for the creation, existence, and perpetuation of the 
perceiver’s “point of view” in the Lockean theory of personhood?134 
Most convincingly among the traditional attacks on Locke is that 
we consider infants to be persons,135 and they possess none of the 
self-reflection or memory capacities Locke ascribes as definitionally 
necessary to be considered a person.  One could answer that we 
consider the infant to be a person, not based on its current state, but 
rather our understanding that it is on a developmental path that 
inevitably will lead it to having the capacities to be a Lockean 
“person.”  In other words, if it forever stayed in its infant form—if it 
were a sub-species called “infants”—it would not be a person.  But I 
would disagree.  I have a grandchild who is eighteen months old at 
the time I am writing this.  I do not think he has a self-reflected sense 
of self, and in all likelihood, he will have no memory of this stage of 
his life.  Still, he is my favorite person in the world to spend time 
with—the funniest, most entertaining, most purely loving person I 
have ever known. 
 
132 Matthews, supra note 95, at 171. 
133 Id. at 170–71.  In fact, under the classic metaphysical view, a person is not 
manifested by a self-reflecting consciousness, but rather by a soul that persists over time.  
See, e.g., JOHN H. LEITH, BASIC CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 112 (1993) (“Karl Barth defined 
the soul as the person or the self in all of its powers and reasoning, of willing, of self-
transcendence. . . . The soul is the self that contemplates the self and organizes all the 
energies and vitalities of life for freely chosen goals.” (footnote omitted)). 
134 For a discussion concerning why modern Lockeans lack a satisfactory explanation 
for “point of view,” see Luntley, supra note 101, at 109–12. 
135 See Matthews, supra note 95, at 171. 
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But the significance of non-Lockean philosophers for our purposes 
is not their philosophical attacks on Locke’s premises.  Rather, their 
significance emerges in their rejection of the idea that the person is 
solely the function of the internal, that the subjective is housed solely 
within.  Though the philosophical positions vary, and even at times 
come into disagreement, all these philosophers posit a notion of self 
that, at least in part, is a function of the external.  For them, mind is 
formed in relationship with others and “the world.”  This 
philosophical move, which might be termed “externalism,” has 
serious implications for how we view the personhood and personal 
identity of dementia sufferers. 
Externalism . . . is a thesis about the relation between the mind and 
the world: it says that the world enters constitutively into the 
individuation of states of mind; mind and world are not, according 
to externalism, metaphysically independent categories, sliding 
smoothly past each other.136 
The point of “externalism” as a philosophical perspective in all its 
variations is that our personhood and identity is in great part public 
and can be publicly maintained even with diminished capacities. This 
is best illustrated by the broadly held notion that personal identity is a 
creation of narrative, the story of who we are.137  This creation is an 
active process entailing the “on-going integration of possible 
perspectives and versions of who an individual is into a coherent and 
meaningful life story.”138  It is a mixture of fact and fiction, 
journalism and movie making, in part a process of identifying with 
the values, norms, and such of a particular community.139  But these 
stories are in no sense solely the work of the individual.  These 
identities are constituted “by a complex interaction between first-, 
second-, and third-person perspectives.”140  Other people and society 
will place constraints and limitations on the stories the self-narrator 
can tell.141 
 
136 COLIN MCGINN, MENTAL CONTENT 9 (1989); see also Hughes et al., supra note 15, 
at 16. 
137 See Grant Gillett, Cognition: Brain Pain: Psychotic Cognition, Hallucinations, and 
Delusions, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY: A COMPANION 21, 29–30 (Jennifer 
Radden ed., 2004). 
138 Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107, at 74. 
139 Id. 
140 Id.  See generally HILDE LINDEMANN NELSON, DAMAGED IDENTITIES, NARRATIVE 
REPAIR (2001). 
141 See Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107, at 74–75. 
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The shape of our lives [i.e., a beginning, middle, and ending that 
makes some sort of sense] is, at least in part, a function of our 
imagination and choices.  But we do not act in a vacuum.  There are 
biological structures within which we think and act and there are 
social structures which determine the options we take ourselves to 
have.142 
Even when we lose the cognitive capacity to recall, tell, or add to our 
own story, it can still exist through third parties.143  Thus, others can 
support a person’s identity even when that person no longer can 
create their own narrative.144  These are not stories told at one’s 
funeral or afterwards.  These are stories of the individual who is 
physically embodied in his or her own existence.  As such, it affects 
how we perceive the demented individual before us.  Plainly, the 
individual’s narrative is weakened, but this is something we must 
accept when confronting dementia.145  While no longer the author in 
a full sense, the demented person is nonetheless the subject of the 
story.146 
Identity through the “webs of interlocution”147 within which we 
live is a variant on narrative.  I am John Mitchell, son of Lenore and 
Jim; brother to Kathy; husband to Eva; father to David and Sarah; 
friend to Mehmet; colleague to Anne, Marilyn, and Annette; teacher 
of evidence; student of John Kaplan; graduate from Stanford Law 
School in 1970; and so on.  An analogous conception was expressed 
as follows: 
My self-definition is understood as an answer to the question Who I 
am.  And this question finds its original sense in the interchange of 
speakers.  I define who I am by defining where I speak from, in the 
family tree, in social space, in the geography of social statuses and 
functions, in my intimate relations to the ones I love, and also 
 
142 Bavidge, supra note 2, at 42. 
143 See F. Brian Allen & Peter G. Coleman, Spiritual Perspectives on the Person with 
Dementia: Identity and Personhood, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 205, 216; John 
McMillan, Identity, Self, and Dementia, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 63, 69; 
Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 200 (explaining that family members hold pieces of the 
demented person’s identity through history, mannerisms, etc.). 
144 See Aquilina & Hughes, supra note 20, at 152; Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107, 
at 83. 
145 See Radden & Fordyce, supra note 107, at 84. 
146 See id.  In contrast to the third-person storyteller, as a result of the fluctuating 
awareness of their symptoms, the “story” of her disease is a “narrative of chaos.”  See 
Phinney, supra note 95, at 340–41. 
147 See McMillan, supra note 143, at 66–67. 
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crucially in the space of moral and spiritual orientation within 
which my most important defining relations are lived out.148 
Such a view of personal identity, as an interconnected web of 
exterior relationships, plainly exists outside the inner world of the 
individual (although exact knowledge of precisely what these 
relationships “mean” to the individual may be difficult to access in 
the case of the demented person).  The identity persists regardless of 
cognitive failure.149 
However, could one use these same theories of social construction 
and intersubjectivity, which have been posited to maintain the 
personal identity of the demented person, to conclude that a particular 
individual lacks such a personal identity?  If we are talking only about 
empirical observations of discrete individuals, the answer may well be 
yes.  My family and I interacted with my mother and shared her 
stories, and thus were part of her webs of interlocution.  But imagine 
a severely demented person who has no one.  They stare into space in 
a state geriatric ward.  No one interacts with them, is aware of them, 
and carries their story.  Under our intersubjective, narrative, and 
social construction and webs of interlocution theories, has this 
individual not lost personal identity?  I do not believe so because I do 
not believe that when applied to the demented, these theories are 
merely empirical descriptions of particular factual instances.  Rather, 
these theories are imbued with normativity. 
A solitary, demented individual is a human being.  To allow his or 
her limited capacity to preserve a semblance of a personal identity to 
be extinguished for lack of any social support is factually 
understandable but unpardonable.  However constricted, he or she can 
continue to exist as an individual if a caregiver pays attention—a 
touch, a look, a fragile web enveloping a person outside of the 
 
148 See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
IDENTITY 35 (1989). 
149 There is a final theory of identity sameness, which, unlike the others previously 
discussed, does not concern the nature of making meaning.  It focuses on the nature of 
being human.  Under this view, humans are inherently “bounded beings.”  See Lesser, 
supra note 95, at 59.  We are born, grow, decline, and die.  We always are changing from 
our past and into our future.  See id.  An essential feature of our identity is that we will 
decline.  As part of that we may have vascular problems or we may get lucky and never 
experience any coronary difficulties.  We may develop dementia or we could be lucky and 
die with our minds relatively intact.  The point is that in our inevitable decline, one of the 
possibilities we could suffer is dementia.  This range of possible ways to decline has 
always been essentially defining who we were as human beings—beings whose decline 
could take one of a widely ranging set of paths.  Dementia is just one such path; the person 
is still the same (bounded by the inevitability of some narrative of decline). 
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individual who looks and thinks: “This is the person who likes apple 
sauce, the person who pissed on the floor and tried to clean it with her 
dress, the person who had the hiccups when the handbell choir came 
over to perform.”  As a decent society, we owe demented individuals 
at least that level of care under any circumstances, particularly if their 
circumstances are the reflection of the “self-fulfilling dynamics” 
carefully explored in the next section of this Article. 
Professor Martha C. Nussbaum takes an analogous tack in her 
profound book, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership.150  Nussbaum suggests an approach to establishing a 
just society that meets what she perceives to be deficiencies in John 
Rawls’s contractarian approach151 when dealing with the place of the 
mentally disabled.152  She does not discuss dementia, but her ideas 
are quite applicable to this area.  In place of Rawls’s procedural 
approach to establishing such a society, Nussbaum focuses on a 
societal obligation to support a minimum level of development of a 
set of “capabilities” she believes necessary to live a life of human 
dignity.153  These capabilities include life, bodily health, affiliation, 
and control over one’s environment.154  In the case of the mentally or 
physically disabled, these requirements for a life of human dignity, 
and thus a just society in Nussbaum’s view, place broad obligations 
on the body politic to ensure the individual develops all their 
capabilities: 
[T]he Rawlsian emphasis on income and wealth suggests that the 
relevant resources are items that we can distribute to individuals.  
Sen’s critique does not explicitly dispute this.  Give the person in 
the wheelchair enough money, he seems to say, and he will be able 
to move from here to there; the only problem is to determine the 
amount of money.  This reply is insufficient.  No matter how much 
money we give the person in the wheelchair, he will still not have 
adequate access to public space unless public space itself is 
redesigned.  Maybe a very rich person could afford a full-time 
chauffeur and a set of bearers who could carry him up the stairs of 
rampless buildings.  But even if making people with impairments 
that rich were a sensible goal of public policy, as it is not, we would 
still have not gotten to the root of the matter, which is that this 
 
150 See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, 
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006). 
151 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (discussing a 
contractarian approach to justice). 
152 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 150, at 98–99. 
153 See id. at 70. 
154 Id. at 76–78. 
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person should not have to rely on a chauffeur or on bearers.  There 
should be wheelchair access on buses and sidewalks, and all 
buildings should have ramps and wheelchair-accessible 
elevators.155 
Perhaps, analogous to Nussbaum’s example of the person in the 
wheelchair, our society likewise should provide resources for 
meaningful caregiving for the demented.  Governmental obligations 
aside, as fellow human beings we cannot ethically allow the identity 
of a demented person, stagnating in some state institution, to dissolve 
for lack of minimal efforts at human interaction.  Along with the 
theories nestled under the umbrella of “externalism” comes a 
corresponding obligation to be agents of intersubjectivity to our 
fellow humans suffering from dementia. 
C.  The Need to Combat Self-Fulfilling Dynamics 
Debunking the myth of the empty shell is not sufficient because 
real-life self-fulfilling dynamics—”positioning and labeling” and 
“malignant psychology”—force dementia sufferers into the role of the 
empty shell. 
Interactive labels affect both the labeler and the one labeled.156  
When a person is labeled as demented, others “position” themselves 
in such a way that the demented person is seen as lesser, 
marginalized.157  We all take positions as to others and to ourselves 
relative to that other.158  The “[p]ositions help to define, strengthen, 
or weaken [the other] person’s moral and personal attributes and help 
to create story-lines about [the person].”159 
While most of us can counter false, negative positioning—e.g., I 
trip, and you position me as “clumsy”; I retort that there was a huge 
crack in the sidewalk, pointing it out for all to see—because of their 
 
155 Id. at 167. 
A decent society will organize public space, public education, and other relevant 
areas of public policy to support such lives [i.e., the lives of the mentally and 
physically disabled] and fully include them, giving the caregivers all the 
capabilities on our list, and the disabled as many of them, and as fully, as is 
possible. 
Id. at 222. 
156 See Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 3. 
157 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 271. 
158 See Steven R. Sabat, Mind, Meaning, and Personhood in Dementia: The Effects of 
Positioning, in DEMENTIA, supra note 2, at 287, 289. 
159 Id. 
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language deficits, a person with dementia cannot easily counteract 
false positioning.160  The label of “patient”161 will all but assure that 
the demented individual will be equated with the disease, and that all 
behavior will be attributed to the disease,162 and not with the 
institutional treatment or caregiver assumptions about the demented 
person’s capacities. 
Thus, if dementia is detached from the social and interactive and 
seen only within the lens of neuropathology, the person suffering 
from dementia will be perceived as solely comprised of disease and 
deficits.163  All the “troublesome” language and behavior will be 
perceived as symptoms of the disease, irrational and meaningless as 
to content, and therefore, appropriately ignored socially and instead 
treated medically.164 
In fact, even very experienced, compassionate Alzheimer’s 
caregivers often tend to see the person’s troublesome behavior as part 
of the disease and not as part of the person.165  There is no doubt in 
my mind from watching my mother’s decline that there was 
something good about her experienced caregivers’ ability to just 
laugh when the always dignified mother of my childhood would 
mouth, “Get over here fat ass.”  But there is an equally troubling, if 
not harmful, aspect to this approach if it is the invariable prism 
 
 A position in a conversation, then, is a metaphorical concept through 
reference to which a person’s ‘moral’ and personal attributes as a speaker are 
compendiously collected.  One can position oneself or be positioned as e.g., 
powerful or powerless, confident or apologetic, dominant or submissive, 
definitive or tentative, authorized or unauthorized, and so on.  A ‘position’ can be 
specified by reference to how a speaker’s contributions are hearable with respect 
to these and other polarities of character, and sometimes even of role.  Positioned 
as dependent, one’s cry of pain is hearable as a plea for help.  But positioned as 
dominant, a similar cry can be heard as a protest or even as a reprimand.  It can 
easily be seen that the social force of an action and the position of the actor and 
interactors mutually determine one another. 
L. van Lagenhove & R. Harré, Introducing Positioning Theory, in POSITIONING THEORY: 
MORAL CONTEXTS OF INTENTIONAL ACTION, 14, 17 (Ron Harré & Luk van Langenhove 
eds., 1999). 
160 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 289.  See generally van Lagenhove & Harré supra note 
159, at 20. 
161 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 297; Snyder, supra note 66, at 271. 
162 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 287, 289. 
163 Murna Downs et al., Understandings of Dementia: Explanatory Models and Their 
Implications for the Person with Dementia and Therapeutic Effort, in DEMENTIA, supra 
note 2, at 235, 239–44 (discussing the “medical model” approach to dementia). 
164 See Downs et al., supra note 163, at 240. 
165 See Oppenheimer, supra note 67, at 202. 
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through which the demented are viewed.  This dark perspective has 
been labeled “malignant social psychology.”166 
What is characterized as “challenging” or “troublesome” behavior, 
far from being no more than meaningless external manifestations of 
the disease, is often an attempt to communicate needs and feelings.167  
As such the “paranoid symptomology” that the individual is accusing 
caregivers of stealing belongings may be more than a consequence of 
serious memory loss.  Rather, the person may be communicating the 
image of one from whom everything is being taken away, and who is 
therefore unreasonably wary about the fate of remaining 
possessions.168  This view may or may not be a bit far-fetched.  But 
there is nothing far-fetched in thinking that people’s challenging 
behavior at mealtimes may be an attempt to communicate some 
genuine feeling about the food, where they are seated and with whom, 
their level of hunger, the time of meals in the facility, etc. 
Herein lies the malignancy.  Demented persons experience the 
breakdown of communication with others, increasingly feeling “shut 
out.”169  Nevertheless, they communicate on many levels besides 
regular language.170  If attempts at communication lead to negative 
experiences (shame, anger, being ignored) because the caregiver 
perceived these attempts to be just meaningless symptoms of the 
disease, demented persons may further withdraw and cease 
attempting to communicate.171  The vicious cycle of decline follows 
with the person increasingly losing the capacity to make meaning.172  
If one treats the person as if he or she makes no sense, he or she will 
not communicate.  If one does the opposite, one may begin to 
understand.173 
 
166 See TOM KITWOOD, DEMENTIA RECONSIDERED: THE PERSON COMES FIRST 46–47 
(1997). 
167 See Downs et al., supra note 163, at 245. 
168 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 265. 
169 Id. at 259, 261. 
170 See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 143, at 67–68; Snyder, supra note 66, at 260 
(demented persons communicate through body gestures, voice tones, facial expression, 
and mime); Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 179. 
171 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 261. 
172 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 179, 187. 
173 See Snyder, supra note 66, at 261; see also Guy A.M. Widdershoven & Ron L.P. 
Berghmans, Advance Directives in Dementia Care: From Instructions to Instruments, 44 
PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 179, 184 (2001) (stating that demented persons can 
communicate, but communication takes more time and patience than most are willing to 
give). 
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In her first residence, my mother confronted malignant positioning 
firsthand.  We received a call from the residence.  “Your Mom threw 
a lamp at the nursing desk.  Come down!”  Sure enough, there was the 
smashed lamp at the base of the central nursing station. 
Mom was in her room, looking a bit sheepish.  “Mom, did you 
throw a lamp?” Smile, nod.  “Mom, did you do that deliberately?”  
Smile, nod.  “Mom, why did you deliberately throw a lamp at the 
nursing desk?”  Mom was having greater and greater difficulty 
expressing herself.  The word she was groping for would almost be 
there and then float away from her, and she would grasp for the 
closest categorical approximation that she would associate in her 
mind for the real word she was looking for.  Thus, her attempt to say 
“the attendant” may come out as “the work thing.”  Much decoding 
was necessary.  But, slowly, we got the story.  An attendant came to 
shower Mom several times a week.  Mom’s skin was very sensitive, 
and the spray of water from the shower was uncomfortable for her.  
This particular 180-pound attendant, however, could not have cared 
less what this babbling old woman was saying.  She would grab 
Mom, force her into the shower, and roughly scrub her hair, really 
hurting and frightening Mom.  Think about it from Mom’s side.  A 
huge thug had a key to just walk into her home at will and beat her 
up.  Mom was alone, defenseless.  Her home, rather than providing a 
sense of security, made her vulnerable and available to this demon.  
What could Mom do?  She went to complain at the nursing desk.  She 
stood there, and they ignored her.  So she picked up the lamp on the 
counter and threw it.  “Then they paid attention to me.”  Smile. 
Even at this supposedly posh residence, the elderly were being 
abused.  They were just as vulnerable, and the low-skill, low-pay, 
minimally educated attendants differed little from those in any other 
facility dealing with the elderly.  Her attempt to report that abuse, 
however, was interpreted solely through the lens of neuropathology.  
Due to malignant positioning, it was unimaginable to the staff that 
this crazy lamp-hurling woman may have come to the nursing desk 
with a legitimate complaint. 
Consistent with the concept of “malignant social psychology,” 
studies show that demented patient’s neurological functioning is 
damaged by impoverished environments174 and enhanced by rich 
 
174 See Downs et al., supra note 163, at 245. 
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ones,175 including dementia support groups.176  Similar inferences are 
derived from studies of “excess disability” in dementia sufferers.177  
Excess disability refers to persons who showed far more impairment 
than one would expect from the actual damage to the brain found 
during an autopsy.178  Social environment seems a likely suspect to 
account for the disparity. 
Old age psychiatrists daily see patients who experience some threat 
to their autonomy, and a minority of our patients, at some point in 
their lives, can scarcely be said to make autonomous decisions at 
all. Yet we see that these patients, for all their impaired autonomy, 
play an immensely significant part in the lives of the people who are 
connected to them.  They are participants in relationships that can 
be joyful and rewarding; or troublesome, full of pain and guilt; 
relationships deeply rooted in the past, or fresh encounters between 
a new carer and the person needing care.  It is the emotional context 
of these relationships (or their absence) that determine how much 
the person flourishes or withers, how much his potential for 
affection, enjoyment, humour, and the vivid communication of 
feeling, are stifled or expressed.179 
Having shattered the myth of the empty shell, we can now look 
squarely at the numerous impediments to constructing a regulatory 
regime for PAS and dementia.  As the following will demonstrate, 
those impediments will prove insurmountable. 
III 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN ACCEPTABLE LEGAL REGIME 
TO REGULATE PAS AND DEMENTIA 
A.  The Paradox of Dementia and Consent to Physician-Assisted 
Suicide 
When considering PAS and, for example, terminal cancer, the issue 
of ensuring that the decision to end one’s life was the result of a true 
 
175 For a discussion of techniques for improving communication, see BAYLES & 
TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 195–202.  But see Stephen G. Post, Alzheimer Disease and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 7 ALZHEIMER DISEASE & ASSOCIATED DISORDERS 65, 67 
(1993) (expressing concern that if the law permits PAS for dementia, then society will 
cease trying to develop ways to improve treatment of demented persons). 
176 BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 262–64. 
177 See id. at 125, 131; Brody et al., supra note 91, at 125, 131. 
178 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 293. 
179 Catherine Oppenheimer, Ethics in Old Age Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRIC ETHICS 317, 
321 (Sidney Bloch et al. eds., 3d. ed. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Hughes et al., 
supra note 15, at 25. 
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autonomous choice is not unproblematic.  Concerns about possible 
coercion by family180 or coercion embedded within the patient-
physician interchange181 are prevalent.  Even more so is the question 
of the chooser’s mental competency,182 as suicidal ideation in general 
 
180 See Leon R. Kass, “I Will Give No Deadly Drug”: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, in 
THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra note 8, at 17, 19. 
This is a recurrent and real concern, which appears anywhere there is a 
discussion of assisted suicide. Very sick people are extremely vulnerable.  They 
are exhausted from fighting the disease and pain and often depressed by what is 
happening to them.  In this state, they are often ambivalent about suicide, 
changing their minds back and forth in relatively short periods of time.  America 
has such a strong culture of independence and self-reliance that dependence 
becomes a source of shame.  And very sick people are extremely dependent; yet, 
ironically, this culture of self-reliance leads them to distance themselves from 
others at the very time they most need others.  I know it bothered my father, 
though he never said so.  They are also extremely sensitive about being a 
financial and emotional burden on their loved ones.  Under these circumstances, 
they are susceptible to pressure from those close to them conveying the message 
that it is time for them to die, especially since they might already feel they have a 
“duty” to die. 
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 54–55 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 54–55, nn.26–34. 
181 See J.P. Bishop, Framing Euthanasia, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 225, 227 (2006) (using 
experience with Do Not Resuscitate orders to demonstrate how doctors can completely 
influence their patients’ choices by the specific word choices the physicians use in 
presenting options); see also RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, EUTHANASIA IN THE 
NETHERLANDS: THE POLICY AND PRACTICE OF MERCY KILLING 97–98 (2004) (observing 
that by presenting the topic of euthanasia as a just “medical” option, doctors can influence 
their patients’ decisions); Callahan & White, supra note 3, at 28 (addressing the difficulty 
of assessing the adequacy of a particular patient’s consent for PAS because the patient will 
be dead). 
182 See Malcolm Parker, End Games: Euthanasia Under Interminable Scrutiny, 19 
BIOETHICS 523, 526 (2005) (Australian researchers claim a new psychiatric diagnosis, 
Demoralization Syndrome (DS), rules out the possibility of a rational suicide, finding the 
“desire to die being symptomatic of the detectable pathological condition.”); Mark D. 
Sullivan et al., Should Psychiatrists Serve as Gatekeepers for Physician-Assisted Suicide?, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 1998, at 24, 25 (explaining that the modern medical 
model concluded that suicide is never the choice of a rational agent, but rather a symptom 
of mental illness); see also David M. Clarke & David W. Kissane, Demoralization: Its 
Phenomenology and Importance, 36 AUST. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 733 (2002); Lillie & 
Werth, Jr., supra note 14, at 2 (“Let me be clear here: I do not agree with the concept of 
rational suicide, especially as applied to people with disabilities, primarily because of 
social and cultural concerns . . . .”).  But see HUMPHRY & CLEMENT, supra note 11, at 76 
(explaining that suicide can be a totally rational response to a particular situation); James 
G. Adams, Life or Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Emergency Medicine, 3 ACAD. 
EMERGENCY MED. 909, 909 (1996) (finding sixty-one percent of primary care physicians 
believe that suicide can be rational);. Kyriaki Mystakidou et al., The Evolution of 
Euthanasia and Its Perceptions in Greek Culture and Civilization, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & 
MED. 95, 96 (2005) (“Though suicide is generally viewed to be a pathological state of 
mind, most often linked to depression, some professionals hypothesize that suicide in 
some circumstances can be quite rational.”); Parker, supra, at 527 (seeing the fact that 
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is strongly correlated with mental illness,183 and not surprisingly, 
those with terminal illnesses seeking PAS are often depressed.184 
Allowing PAS for dementia surely raises all these concerns.  It also 
raises what I term a “Catch-22” problem.185  Autonomous decision 
making presupposes that two conditions exist for choosers: (1) they 
have full information186 and (2) they are competent.187  It is not 
difficult to imagine someone with cancer who has been diagnosed 
with having six months to live as possessing both the knowledge (i.e., 
the diagnosis and the likely course of disease) and the mental capacity 
to make an autonomous choice to seek PAS.  But dementia is 
different. 
Before the onset of the dementia, the individual plainly has the 
capacity to make a meaningful choice.  But does the person have 
anything like full information?  It is correct, as proponents of 
complete autonomy assert, that all choices we make about matters 
that will take place in the future involve things we do not know;188 
none of us can see into the future.  However, this situation seems 
qualitatively different.  I choose a mate to marry, expend large 
amounts of money on education to prepare for a career, and book 
cross-Atlantic flights on nonrefundable tickets.  The reality is that 
 
those refusing to accept that someone can rationally choose PAS but not making the same 
claim about the rationality of those who refuse life-sustaining treatment “suggests that a 
particular moral view about assisted dying is helping to demonstrate the existence of the 
clinical disorder [undermining the capacity for rational suicide]”). 
183 KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, NIGHT FALLS FAST: UNDERSTANDING SUICIDE (1999); 
SUICIDE (Robert Emmet Long ed., H.W. Wilson Co. 1995) (reprinting various magazine 
articles). 
184 See N. Gregory Hamilton & Catherine A. Hamilton, Competing Paradigms of 
Response to Assisted Suicide Requests in Oregon, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1060, 1060 
(2005) (“Although physical illness may be a precipitating cause of despair, these patients 
usually suffer from treatable depression and are always ambivalent about their desire for 
death.”).  But see Chochinov & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 268 (explaining that the 
correlation between suicidal ideation and hopelessness is greater than that between suicidal 
ideation and depression); Sullivan et al., supra note 182, at 24, 28 (showing that the 
terminally ill seeking PAS are not more likely to be depressed). 
185 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “Catch-22” as: 
[A] supposed law or regulation containing provisions which are mutually 
frustrating . . . ; a set of circumstances in which one requirement, etc., is 
dependent upon . . . the first.  Freq. attrib., esp. as Catch-22 situation.  [f. a 
paradoxical rule postulated in the novel Catch-22 . . . , by Joseph Heller. . . . 
2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 973 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1989). 
186 See Todd Goldberg, A Doctor Looks at Assisted Suicide, 1 NAVIGATOR 35 (1998). 
187 See SOMERVILLE, supra note 7, at 317–20. 
188 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 181–82. 
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none of these choices may turn out as I envisioned.189  Yet in the 
future, my reality will still be my own, perceived through the mind 
with which I have become familiar.  The experience may have 
“changed” me in some respects—from open to cautious, optimistic to 
cynical, sloppy to careful about details, happy to sad, filled with love 
to filled with anger, or vice versa—but the basic way my mind 
functions as a mind will not have changed.  I will just have 
incorporated an additional or modified set of conceptual schemata 
into my semantic memory. 
With more than mild dementia this simply will not be true.  
Thinking about being demented is not analogous to thinking about 
any other future prospect.  In this situation, you are literally 
considering how you would think if your mechanisms for thinking 
and communicating were radically different.  I do not think that is 
really possible.  I can talk to others I respect about the realities of 
marriage or a career as a graphic artist,190 but I do not see how I can 
do that with someone with dementia.  It is not that they cannot tell 
their stories—they can.191  It is just that I can only look at their stories 
through an undemented mind.  Though I can feel empathy toward and 
understand in a narrative sense what those with dementia are saying 
when relating their experiences, I cannot really comprehend what it 
would be like to have a radically differently functioning mind when 
my only tool of comprehension is my ordinarily functioning mind.  I 
have an imagination, and actors and actresses are certainly capable of 
convincingly “playing” a demented person, such as in the movie 
Iris.192  These performances of the imagination are nevertheless 
effectively external.  Dementia is the object of the audience’s 
nondemented subjectivity.  I can imagine the world of the demented 
through my eyes but not through their brains. 
Less philosophically, dementia sufferers are no more alike than 
those without dementia.  We are all unique individuals, demented or 
not.  Individuals thus experience dementia differently,193 both due to 
 
189 See Daniel Gilbert, Foreword to STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS, supra note 10, at xvi–
xvii. 
190 See GILBERT, supra note 10, at 251–56. 
191 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  But see Phinney, supra note 95, at 340 
(explaining that those with mild to moderate dementia are unaware of or deny memory 
deficits). 
192 IRIS (Miramax Films 2001) (telling the story of Irish novelist Iris Murdoch as she 
suffered from Alzheimer’s disease). 
193 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 13. 
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the persona they are and to the specific area and magnitude of organic 
damage to the brain.194  Additionally, no matter how we position 
ourselves on the philosophical issue of whether the “person” may or 
may not “survive” when suffering serious dementia, it is true that 
some people with dementia present dramatic personality changes.195 
On the other hand, if we insist that individuals have full 
information before choosing PAS, we run into another set of 
problems.  Once an individual is in the middle stages of Alzheimer’s, 
he or she has a pretty good sense of what it may be like to be 
demented.  The individual’s competence to consent is quite another 
issue.196  Is it enough if the demented person says “I wish I was 
dead?”  This might just be a metaphorical way of expressing sadness 
or even (treatable) depression.  Even if meant at the moment, there is 
no reason to believe the desire will persist.  All of us have bad days, 
and my experience visiting my demented mom in her Alzheimer’s 
residence made it clear to me that so do the demented.  This is 
particularly problematic because the person’s feelings could be the 
result of the care they are receiving, and thus a result of “malignant 
psychology.” 
Moreover, all current and proposed statutes permitting PAS in 
terminal illness require persistency of the request197 and consultation 
with physicians (and mental health professionals if indicated).  But a 
person with middle- or late-stage dementia may not be able to 
understand the information provided in a consultation,198 and have 
great difficulty retaining or retrieving it from memory after the 
consultations to “think it over.”  Also, because demented individuals 
have lost their values framework in their semantic memory,199 they 
 
194 “The profiles of cognitive-communicative deficits of individuals with dementia 
reflect the distribution of neuropathology associated with their disease.”  BAYLES & 
TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 36. 
195 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 290. 
196 See BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 66 (stating that the demented person 
experiences diminished comprehension of both written and spoken word).  Interestingly, a 
similar conundrum has been explored in the context of cult programming.  See Richard 
Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First 
Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (1977) (positing that in some settings, such as 
religious brainwashing in cults, an individual begins with full capacity but lacks 
knowledge; while later, when the individual acquires more knowledge, the capacity has 
suffered diminution). 
197 Existing PAS regimes require persistency in requesting PAS.  See MITCHELL, supra 
note 5, at 77–78 (The Netherlands); id. at 90 (Oregon). 
198 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 180. 
199 See id. 
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will likely be unable to evaluate the information discussed, even if 
they can somehow retain it in memory.  This is not intended to 
demean the dementia sufferer’s capacity for understanding and ability 
to make meaning.  Realistically, however, the option of PAS would 
be an intellectually, emotionally, psychologically, spiritually, and 
existentially difficult conversation for any of us at our best.  The 
dementia sufferer is not at his or her best. 
What about setting the line at something comparable to early-stage 
Alzheimer’s?  Surely at that point, the person has a fairly vivid 
picture of what lies in store for them while still retaining their 
cognitive decision-making capacities.  This superficially seems akin 
to the “bright line” of “terminal illness with less than six months to 
live.”  In fact, early-stage Alzheimer’s has diagnostic criteria 
including specific ranges of results from tests.  Granted, this may be 
the period of time when the person is most frightened,200 aware of 
being both in the world that was (and in which participation is still 
somewhat possible) and the world that awaits (and into which 
entrance is inevitable).  However, this is the kind of decision for 
which there is really no ideal time. 
If we accepted this “early Alzheimer’s” line,201 we would still have 
to evaluate what this person could decide.  For a number of reasons, I 
don’t think we would contemplate “kill me tomorrow.”  This is not 
like the “six months to live” metaphor.  No one really knows how to 
 
200 See MACE & RABINS, supra note 18, at 122. 
201 I recognize that my construction of the semidemented state (where, on the one hand, 
the person has some firsthand experience with dementia while, on the other, the person 
retains sufficient competence to make an autonomous choice) will likely completely lose 
its neat analytic compass in real-life application.  People often engage in denial or 
obfuscating behavior at this stage.  Thus, it is very common for people exhibiting early 
signs of dementia to refuse to admit or acknowledge the condition, while becoming angry 
when the possibility is suggested.  MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 21.  But see id. at 
23 (indicating some feel better because they know it is a disease and they are not “stupid”).  
Conversely, families understandably are often equally reluctant to acknowledge the 
deteriorating mental status of a loved one, especially since some memory loss is part of the 
normal aging process.  See id. at 4–5; BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 47–48.  Will 
early dementia sufferers want to sit down and discuss an advanced directive for a 
condition they (and their families) are inclined to refuse to even acknowledge? 
 My family really did not face the fact that mom had dementia.  We attributed her 
behavior to everything but dementia.  By the time we acknowledged her condition, she 
was well past early-stage Alzheimer’s. 
 How common will this be for others, especially considering the difficulty of assessing 
the cognitive location of the person at any particular time along dementia’s journey?  
Plainly, it would be absurd to think of these stages as bright-lined, like crossing a national 
border.  It will be a combination of medicine, intuition, and storytelling about and with the 
person. 
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calculate at which point someone with dementia actually is 
“terminal.”202  A demented person can live for a decade or more after 
diagnosis.203  Will we let someone have medical assistance in dying 
because of the (perhaps justified) fear of what the future will hold, 
though that future may not arise for many years?  The person almost 
certainly will worsen over time, but it will be in increments.  In those 
years, treatments, even a cure, could become available.  In fact, some 
treatments currently exist,204 and with the threat of dementia to the 
relatively affluent population bulge we call the baby boomers, 
research and development in the area is only likely to increase.  
Additionally, our reticence to allow PAS on the basis of the fear of 
the future is understandable when one of our greatest overall concerns 
is cabining the scope of its availability.205 
B.  The Living Will as Delegation of Unrestrained Discretion over the 
Life and Death of the Dementia Sufferer 
What will we allow the dementia sufferer to decide?  We might 
consider, with the persistence of request and consultation 
requirements analogous to those in PAS regimes for terminal 
illnesses, permitting the mildly demented person to author a living 
will or advanced directive laying out the terms under which the 
dementia must have progressed for the person to be euthanized 
(because the sufferer will not be able to understand at that point the 
 
202 MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 206. 
203 For example, the middle stage of Alzheimer’s can last from four to ten years.  
BAYLES & TOMOEDA, supra note 1, at 65. 
204 See source cited supra note 20. 
205 The PAS debate is infused with concerns that once permitted we will not be capable 
of cabining its application: 
Also, it would be difficult to limit suffering to pure physical pain. . . . Suffering is 
far more complex.  It is a mix of the physical, emotional, existential, and 
psychological.  Even suffering from physical pain has emotional and 
psychological elements. . . . In fact, most terminal patients who seek assisted 
suicide do not do so because of physical pain. . . . They are worn down from the 
breakdown of their bodily functions, their inability to care for themselves, 
inability to be part of a social community, the emotional and financial burden 
they feel they are to their loved ones, and their general sense of hopelessness. . . . 
Of course, once law cuts the mooring from physical pain, how can it ignore 
unremitting psychological suffering?  Does a broken leg cause as much physical 
(let alone emotional) pain as having a spouse suddenly announce that she is 
leaving and wants a divorce? 
Mitchell, supra note 7, at 61–62 (footnotes omitted); see also MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 
18. 
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purpose of taking certain pills, or may have even forgotten how to 
swallow,206 so PAS is not really a viable choice).  As with everything 
else in this area, a living will for medical termination of the life of a 
demented person will not be unproblematic. 
Practical issues spring forth about drafting, interpretation, and 
implementation. Philosophical issues arise about privileging the 
semicompetent over the incompetent self.  Social issues emerge about 
cultural coercion for the diagnosed demented to execute living wills 
requesting euthanasia.  Each of these problems merits careful 
consideration. 
Initially, there will be real challenges in drafting.  What are the 
terms or criteria that will trigger the medical termination of life?  You 
cannot use results on tests because they do not necessarily reflect the 
extent of impairment, often overstating the deficits when compared to 
the actual functioning of the individual.207  Perhaps terms meaningful 
to the individual’s narrative will suffice: an inability to recognize any 
immediate family and friends or a lack of orientation to self (e.g., not 
responding to the person’s own name).  While this may initially seem 
clear, it is not as simple and straightforward.  The application of 
advance directives is not considered in some abstracted space.  Like 
treatment, the decision always takes place in a concrete situation and 
requires interpretation.208  “When can the doctor be sure that the 
patient no longer recognizes family and friends?  Is this when their 
names have been forgotten?  Or when [patients] no longer seem to 
regard them as people who mean something to them in some way?  
How should we decide the latter?”209 
Even as to the sufferer not responding to her name, does the person 
really understand who the name refers to but, because of damage to 
certain segments of her brain, cannot express that understanding?  Or 
does the person fully understand but is angry at some treatment (e.g., 
ignored, spoken about in very insulting terms right in front of the 
 
206 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
207 See Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 12, 14; Snyder, supra note 66, at 260. 
208 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 189; Rebecca S. Dresser & 
John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent 
Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 237 
(1989); J.J.M. van Delden, The Unfeasibility of Requests for Euthanasia in Advance 
Directives, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 447, 448–49 (2004). 
209 Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 189. 
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person as if not in existance)?210  How many times does the sufferer 
need to fail to respond to a name before PAS takes its course and the 
person is killed?  Must the person be given a warning first in the 
tradition of a warning shot?  What if the sufferer cannot understand 
the warning due to cognitive deficits, though understanding the name?  
The interpretive point is clear. 
The philosophical issue of privileging opposes a competent self 
executing the directive and an incompetent self potentially being 
executed by the terms of that same directive.  I have posited a less 
than fully competent person, but competent enough—a sort of 
competent-light.  The fact that someone gets lost on walks, forgets to 
take messages, and increasingly struggles to find precisely descriptive 
words does not mean, however, there is a lack of capacity to 
understand the nature and consequence of a life or death decision.  I 
do not believe that posting a semicompetent author of a living will 
changes the basic philosophical question about the legitimacy of 
privileging the wishes of the semicompetent self over the incompetent 
self. 
Proponents of full autonomy argue the wishes of the autonomous 
self (or semiautonomous in the case I am positing) are the only wishes 
that matter as the seriously demented person cannot make 
autonomous choices.211  But this position presents, albeit in a 
different form, the same set of assumptions underlying Lockean 
philosophy and cognitive psychology—that only the self-enclosed, 
self-conscious product of the rational mind counts. 
If the semicompetent and the demented persons were literally 
different “selves,” then the advanced directive would, in effect, be a 
contract for murder by hire.  But that characterization of literally 
different selves does not reflect in any way how I, or anyone I know, 
see the world.  In the end, Mom was very confused and generally not 
accessible to those around her, but she was unequivocally still Mom.  
Still, I have no doubt that the semicompetent self and the incompetent 
self might well have very different interests.212  They might even be 
 
210 See Sabat, supra note 158, at 290–91.  For another scholar who believes that the 
demented should be respected for who they are now, see John A. Robertson, Cruzan and 
the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. 
REV. 1139, 1166–67 (1991); John A. Robertson, Assessing Quality of Life: A Response to 
Professor Kamisar, 25 GA. L. REV. 1243, 1245, 1248 (1991). 
211 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 236; Widdershoven & Berghmans, 
supra note 126, at 181–82. 
212 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 236. 
 2009] Physician-Assisted Suicide and Dementia 1129 
more dissimilar than those of the sixteen-year-old self and the fifty-
five-year-old version. 
Entering into this philosophical fray, Professor Ronald Dworkin213 
would lay down a card on the table that he contends allows the past 
self to trump the present.  He names this card “precedential 
autonomy.”214  The previously expressed desire of the competent (or 
semicompetent in my conception) self trumps because it is an 
expression of who the person really is.  This person has tried to create 
a coherent life, a life with integrity.  It is their autonomous decision as 
to how they want that life to play out (“I am someone who is capable, 
grounded, realistic. I am not someone who is helplessly deluded”),215 
and the decision provides a sense of comfort to them to believe that 
 
 When people become incompetent and seriously ill, however, their interests 
may radically change.  With their reduced mental and physical capacities, what 
was once of extreme importance to them no longer matters, while things that 
were previously of little moment assume much greater significance.  An 
existence that seems demeaning and unacceptable to the competent person may 
still be of value to the incompetent patient, whose abilities, desires and interests 
have so greatly narrowed. 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, for competent individuals to predict their 
interests in future treatment situations when they are incompetent because their 
needs and interests will have so radically changed.  As a result, the directives 
they issue for future situations of incompetency, though they reflect their current 
needs and interests, may have little relevance to their needs and interests once 
they become incompetent.  Indeed, their advance directives may even be 
detrimental to their interests once in that state. 
Id.; see also Tony Hope, Advance Directives About Medical Treatment: Making Up One’s 
Mind While One Still Has a Mind, 304 BRIT. MED. J. 398, 398 (1992). 
213 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 18. 
214 Id. at 224, 226, 232.  For an excellent argument that Dworkin defines autonomy too 
narrowly, so as to incorrectly exclude the demented, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Permanently Demented, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS 
WITH REPLIES BY DWORKIN 195, 202–03 (Justine Burley ed., 2004). 
215 See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 227–28.  On the other hand, the healthy have 
trouble envisioning anything positive in the life of the ill: 
 The tendency that causes us to overestimate the happiness of Californians also 
causes us to underestimate the happiness of people with chronic illnesses or 
disabilities. . . . For example, when sighted people imagine being blind, they 
seem to forget that blindness is not a full-time job.  Blind people can’t see, but 
they do most of the things that sighted people do—they go on picnics, pay their 
taxes, listen to music, get stuck in traffic—and thus they are just as happy as 
sighted people are.  They can’t do everything sighted people can do, . . . and thus 
blind and sighted lives are not identical.  But whatever a blind person’s life is 
like, it is about much more than blindness.  And yet, when sighted people 
imagine being blind, they fail to imagine all the other things that such a life 
might be about, hence they mispredict how satisfying such a life can be. 
GILBERT, supra note 10, at 114–15. 
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this advanced directive will ensure that the ending of their life story 
will be consistent with who they “really are.” 
The core premise underlying Dworkin’s notion of precedential 
autonomy is that the autonomous person chooses the “critical 
interests”216 (central elements of our lives) that define the life story of 
who that person is.  It violates that autonomy if a nonrational (and 
thereby nonautonomous) version subsequently alters that story.217 
I disagree for two reasons.  First, the notion of autonomy as a 
means of creating a coherent “story” of ourselves to be left behind, 
etched in the memory of history, is a false one mired in illusion.  
Every philosophical perspective on narrative as the construct 
establishing identity was oriented around the fundamental conception 
that, though we are active participants in the creation of a self-
narrative, the story is in no sense ours alone.  Limited and 
circumscribed by social conventions, given meaning through 
interaction with others, and being in part a function of how others 
choose to see and “position” us, the notion that we can autonomously 
author our story belies the reality that our stories are created of and in 
the world, and that we have scant control over the external world.218  
 
216 See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 201–07.  For an excellent summary of Dworkin’s 
position, see Shiffrin, supra note 214, at 197, which states: 
Dworkin maintains that a demented person qua demented person lacks a critical 
interest in continuing to live.  Demented people may have experiential interests 
in their lives.  They may have good or bad experiences within them; they can, for 
instance, enjoy comfort and reassurance or feel pain and fear (p. 227).  They 
cannot, however, take a view of their lives as a whole, and hence they cannot 
form opinions about their critical interests.  That is, they cannot assess what 
renders their lives a success or a failure and what, within a life, pays proper heed 
to the sanctity of life (pp. 201, 230).  Moreover, Dworkin thinks that not only are 
demented people incapable of understanding what is in their critical interests, 
they cannot do anything to further their critical interests.  He claims they are 
incapable of the acts and attachments that give life value.  Value, he notes, 
“cannot be poured into a life from the outside; it must be generated by the person 
whose life it is, and this is no longer possible for [the demented person]” (p. 
230). 
217 See DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 227–28; Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 
126, at 181.  But see Thomas May, Slavery, Commitment, and Choice: Do Advance 
Directives Reflect Autonomy?, 8 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 358, 358 (1999) 
(arguing that an advance directive that relinquishes future judgment is inconsistent with 
autonomy because it is the “ability to re-evaluate one’s commitment to the second order 
strategy [i.e., a document such as an advance directive requiring PAS if one becomes 
demented] that is key for the strategy’s consistency with autonomy”). 
218 See supra notes 38, 39, 40 and accompanying text. 
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Further, there is no reason why the chapters of our stories cannot be 
rewritten, altered, or added by a now “mad” author.219 
Second, one may fairly ask why the cognitive is consistently 
privileged over the affective in constructs of personal identity.220  
Perhaps on a Darwinian level one may feel cognitive capacities are 
central to our survival, yet equally central would seem to be our 
instincts and intuition about things in the world.  “Emotional 
intelligence” is not some fringe notion.  Rather, it is accepted as a 
capability that is necessary for success in our modern workplace.221 
Also, language itself does not find its sole function in rational 
dialogue.  Of course language can include a “representational 
dimension” in which one communicates substantive information to 
another, but this is not necessarily so.222  Language can be purely 
“expressive,” containing no representational dimension and instead 
serving as a device to establish “the kind of rapport which is peculiar 
to us linguistic animals.”223  From the mere fact we speak, there is a 
connection.  That connection exists whether speech takes the form of 
a completely unfamiliar foreign language or the seemingly 
unconnected ramblings of some demented individual.  Even when my 
mother could not express a single coherent phrase, there were times 
when she would hold my hands, utter some unintelligible string of 
phrases, and smile, and “the meaning” she expressed and connection I 
experienced was immeasurably more significant than if she had given 
an articulate analysis of the history and current appropriateness of the 
electoral college. 
But my objections go far beyond parting with moral philosophers.  
They reside in the specter of a future world in which staggering 
numbers of old, demented people are put to death.  If we accept 
precedential autonomy, we will come back to problems of 
 
219 In questioning Professor Dworkin’s concept of a coherent life narrative, Rebecca 
Dresser raises a similar thought: Can one’s life story have a “surprise ending”?  Rebecca 
Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 32, 36 (1995). 
220 See Allen & Coleman, supra note 143, at 218 (highlighting the value of the 
“spiritual” nature, which is unrelated to cognition); Post, supra note 115, at 227; 
Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 182.  In fact, one author terms 
“hypercognitive” as a form of moral blindness.  See Post, supra note 115, at 223, 231. 
221 See generally DANIEL COLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (2006); GERALD 
MATTHEWS ET AL., EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: SCIENCE AND MYTH (2002). 
222 See Hughes et al., supra note 15, at 22. 
223 Id.; see also CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 248, 260 (1985). 
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interpretation.  That is obvious.  What is less obvious is that we 
inevitably will have created a regime of absolute, life-and-death 
“interpretive discretion.”  My friend’s mother was severely demented 
and lived in a care facility.  She was cheerful, loved to garden 
throughout her life, and, in the facility, still daily puttered about a 
small plot of lovely flowers.  When my friend, (“Bill”) and his wife of 
eighteen years (“Sue”) visited, the mother would be very, very 
pleasant when they came up to her.  She also had absolutely no idea 
who they were.  One day she said to Sue, while Bill was standing 
right there, “Dearie, too bad you didn’t know my son, Bill.  He’s been 
dead quite a while.  Never married, too bad.  You’d have liked him.” 
If my friend’s mom had executed an advance directive, contingent 
on not knowing close family, then it is fair to say the critical terms 
were met and mom would now be subject to having a lethal injection 
after dinner.  There is not any possibility, however, that a remotely 
nonpsychotic health care professional on this planet would kill this 
delightful woman because of some piece of paper in the file.224  What 
would happen is “interpretive discretion.”  The likely interpretation 
would take the form of something like the following. The fact that she 
talked about her son and marriage, making clear that Bill and Sue 
would have liked each other, implies that on some level she 
comprehends the linkage between Bill and Sue.  Saying her son is 
dead, moreover, is likely a reference to her sense that she and her son 
are lost to each other because of her dementia.  And so the 
interpretation would go. 
But what if my friend’s mom was nasty and always seemed 
unhappy?  Would her interaction with her son and daughter-in-law 
have been similarly interpreted?  And what if it was not and that 
contrary interpretation was in fact incorrect?  There will be no appeals 
for nasty mom, followed by years of habeas corpus petitions making 
their way first through the state and then the federal system.  
Unpleasant mom will be dead by nightfall.  Of course, the fact that 
 
224 I confess to agreeing with Professor Kadish that, in these circumstances, 
“compassion” trumps autonomy.  See Kadish, supra note 110, at 876; accord Shiffrin, 
supra note 214, at 210 (“Likewise, it seems barbaric to ignore the experiential interests of 
people whose lives are filled with simple joys and delight and to cut these lives off short—
to kill them—so that the entire life of [the individual who executed the living will] is 
unsullied by a lingering period of intellectual deterioration and decline.”). 
 Professor Dworkin responds to this by saying that, while carrying out the living will is 
necessary to respect autonomy, other moral values would trump in such a situation.  
Ronald Dworkin, Reply: Seana Valentine Shiffrin, in DWORKIN AND HIS CRITICS WITH 
REPLIES BY DWORKIN, supra note 214, at 370, 370. 
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even unpleasant mom is paying her bills in a high-priced care facility 
would likely have a strong influence on the interpretive stance of the 
members of the care facility, although these are not likely to be the 
people authorized to carry out the actual euthanasia.  But what if the 
family pressures their doctor to invoke the directive (respect for 
mom’s dignity, more money in the—now almost immediate—
inheritance)?  Again, there will be no check on interpretive discretion 
so long as everyone (not counting the demented person) agrees on the 
interpretation.  Only in the case of strong disagreement will there be 
any possibility that courts will get even a whiff of the situation. 
Now change venues.  We are walking into a dementia ward funded 
by an HMO or a vast geriatric, dementia facility in a state mental 
hospital.  The patients have little or no money and most no family or 
outside support.  Is there any doubt how the story of unpleasant mom 
will end? 
There is a final sense in which the specter of coercion rises as a 
very serious issue. I am thinking less about individual family 
members or physicians, though that certainly could happen.  What I 
find more concerning is the possibility that there will emerge an 
understanding that would achieve the status of social expectation, 
even social obligation.225  The litany will proceed as follows: 
dementia sufferers use up a significant amount of our society’s very 
limited funds for health care.226  We have to make difficult decisions, 
triaging our scarce health care resources.  This country has provided 
you with an extraordinary amount of freedom and a materially 
comfortable life, which is the envy of most of the world.  We are now 
asking little from you—in fact, almost nothing.  Now that you have 
been diagnosed with dementia, we ask that you fill out and sign this 
advanced directive form.  And when the time comes, it will not be 
like you are killing yourself.  You will not even exist; only an empty 
shell or a vegetable will mark where you once lived, inhabiting your 
body and swallowing up scarce health care resources that otherwise 
would go to treating sick young children or finding a cure for 
Alzheimer’s. 
 
225 This sentiment in fact was explicitly and publicly expressed by then Colorado 
Governor Richard Lamm: “Elderly people who are terminally ill have a ‘duty to die and 
get out of the way’ instead of trying to prolong their lives by artificial means.”  Gov. 
Lamm Asserts Elderly, if Very Ill, Have “Duty to Die,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1984, at 
A16.  But see Oppenheimer, supra note 179. 
226 See supra notes 29, 30. 
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I am not envisioning that this message will be posted somewhere in 
every café selling lattés.  But within our cultural mind, this “message” 
could become accepted dogma, particularly if sheer costs conjoin with 
a cultural belief that the severely demented are effectively dead, that 
their lives are indistinguishable from cabbages. 
C.  Why an Absolute Ban on Using Living Wills to Facilitate Assisted 
Suicide as a Response to Dementia Is Necessary 
Even given all that has been said, if a relatively small group of 
baby boomers wished to execute these agreements in order to provide 
some peace of mind, that would not be problematic.227  After all, a 
significant percentage of those prescribed lethal pills in Oregon, one 
of the few states that allows euthanasia, do not actually take them; the 
mere existence of the option perhaps permits them to relax.228  Of 
course with an advanced directive for PAS, demented persons will not 
have the ability to change their minds like those who can choose not 
to take the pills.  Rather, they will be relying on the (interpretive) 
kindness of strangers. 
Though I have no personal problem with this notion, there seems 
an insurmountable policy problem with permitting even these “few 
baby boomers” to create advanced directives.  There are no principled 
basis or empirical guess (e.g., that only certain types of individuals, 
small in number, execute such living wills; or that information about 
the actions of these few would not reach the mass of our media-
drenched society) that would ensure these actions would be limited to 
the few.  And, if signing advanced directives becomes a cultural 
norm, then I have a serious problem because of unfettered 
“interpretive discretion.”  While this may also apply to current living 
wills, which include “Do Not Resuscitate” provisions, there is a huge 
difference with dementia.  Living wills that permit tubes to be pulled 
and treatments not to be carried out (e.g., not treating pneumonia 
when a person is dying of cancer or a ninety-year-old patient is 
completely demented and has serious heart difficulties), are all 
cabined to a very circumscribed set of conditions—gravely ill people, 
 
227 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 237; Linda Ganzini et al., Physicians’   
Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557, 563 
(2000). 
228 One inference from this is mere existence of the opportunity to end their lives allows 
them to relax.  See BARRY ROSENFELD, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE 
INTERFACE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND MEDICAL ETHICS 152–53 (2004). 
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generally in hospitals, dependent on machines for survival.229  In 
contrast, the environment in which PAS for dementia could be carried 
out is vast.230 
Some scholars have suggested that advanced directives could be 
used as a heuristic device (a “tool”) rather than a mandatory 
device.231  Used in conjunction with consultation with family and 
friends, attempted discussion with “the patient,” and input by 
physician and caregiver, the decision whether to end the person’s life 
would be made.232  While this may sound good, if PAS is legal and 
advanced directives for dementia are the norm, this seemingly rational 
and philosophically supportable233 approach generally will be 
meaningless.  For many, there will be no one with whom to consult, 
 
229 Persons currently have at least a common law, and perhaps even a constitutional, 
right to refuse otherwise lifesaving medical treatment.  See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–74 (1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).  One has 
no comparable right to assistance in dying other than the removal of life-maintaining 
medical equipment.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  Nonetheless, 
the right to refuse lifesaving treatment is very significant given that currently eighty 
percent of people die in hospitals or nursing homes.  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302.  About 
seventy percent of those die as the result of some treatment decision, such as withdrawing 
support and not providing treatment.  George P. Smith II, Restructuring the Principle of 
Medical Futility, 11 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 9, 9 (1995); Marcia Angell, Helping Desperately 
Ill People to Die, in REGULATING HOW WE DIE: THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL 
ISSUES SURROUNDING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, supra note 11, at 3, 12.  A 
somewhat different estimate (though limited to hospitals) shows that fifty percent of 
deaths in hospitals from nonemergency cases result from withdrawing lifesaving 
treatment.  Robert T. Hall, Final Act: Sorting Out the Ethics of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
54 HUMANIST 10, 10 (1994). 
230 Some have suggested that a living will, which requests cessation of all artificial (or 
spoon) feeding and hydration if the individual’s dementia reaches the point that the person 
no longer recalls how to eat or swallow, would be appropriate.  See STANLEY A. TERMAN, 
THE BEST WAY TO SAY GOODBYE: A LEGAL PEACEFUL CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE 
201–06 (2007).  If this is the limit of using living wills in conjunction with dementia, I 
would not be extremely concerned.  The required status of not recalling how to eat, drink, 
or swallow generally correlates with end-stage dementia and provides a fairly 
circumscribed, somewhat objective standard for implementation of the living will.  If, 
however, refusal of lifesaving treatment were tied to some level of cognitive deterioration 
(e.g., cannot recognize immediate family), then I would strongly object.  Even limiting 
PAS through living wills to cases where the person no longer recalls how to swallow, 
however, will still leave the serious problem of total interpretative discretion will be the 
same. 
231 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 180, 184, 190. 
232 Id. at 182–85.  But cf. Dresser & Robertson, supra note 208, at 239–40 (discussing 
advance directives and withdrawal of treatment for two conscious, but incompetent, 
dementia patients and questioning whether such withdrawal “actually serves the 
incompetent patient’s existing interests”). 
233 See Widdershoven & Berghmans, supra note 126, at 188–90. 
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no one to watch over the person.  For the demented, whether the more 
affluent in private care facilities or the poor in geriatric wards in state 
mental hospitals, a large percentage have no one really involved in 
their lives, notwithstanding some infrequent visits.234  So what will 
happen?  For those without anyone, total interpretive discretion, based 
in part on subjective feelings and relevant costs, will determine 
whether the person will live or die—a bit like thumbs up or down in 
the old Roman Coliseum.  And, perversely, the very “malignancy” of 
the institutional treatment may cause the demented person to appear 
less worthy of life. 
IV 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In previous work, I have argued that suicide and assisted suicide in 
the context of the terminally ill is not immoral.235  I feel basically the 
same about dementia.  My concerns go to different matters, matters as 
tightly woven together as a good rug: our serious societal 
misconceptions about dementia and the demented and the malignant 
interrelationship between our misconceived “labels/positioning” and 
the functioning of the demented in response. 
As a result, I am going to take a bold rhetorical stance.  
“Pollyanna” is a label intended to totally discredit any position that is 
seen as too positive, too dependent on believing in the positive 
possibilities of human nature.  In this rhetorical move, too positive or 
too believing is equated with nonpragmatic, nonrealistic.  But I 
believe that well-considered Pollyannaism236 is pragmatic and, from 
our lived experience, the most promising stance.  We, as a society, 
should never permit PAS for dementia.  Instead, we should (1) 
alleviate fear—dementia is not a phrase to incite terror; it is the result 
of a disease like others, and one needs to understand what really 
happens to those who suffer from it.  We should (2) educate—help 
our society realize that the demented can understand and 
communicate in their own way and that these people are not empty 
 
234 See MARKUT & CRANE, supra note 18, at 125 (discussing the range of reasons 
people do not visit dementia sufferers in institutions). 
235 See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 129. 
236 A term derived from “[t]he name of the heroine of stories written by Eleanor 
Hodgman Porter (1868–1920), American children’s author, used with allusion to her skill 
at the “glad game” of finding cause for happiness in the most disastrous situations; one 
who is unduly optimistic or achieve happiness through self-delusion.”  12 THE OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 43 (Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1989). 
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shells or cabbages.  And we should (3) spend—invest a fraction of 
what we currently spend on sports stadiums on research for treatment 
and (hopefully) cures for Alzheimer’s and other forms of dementia.  
This is a call to recognize our shared humanity, to kneel down in the 
garden with my friend’s demented mother, and share the peace of the 
cool, rich soil. 
 1138 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 1085 
 
